

FISCAL FEDERALISM AND INSECURITY IN NIGERIA

Ewetan, O. O., PhD*

Prof. D. N. Ike**

Prof. I. O. Olurinola*

Abstract

This paper examines the connection between fiscal federalism and insecurity in Nigeria. Many scholars have identified strong links between fiscal federalism and different types of conflicts that breed insecurity. Since independence, the demand for true fiscal federalism, fiscal and political restructuring by different ethnic nationalities in Nigeria has not abated. The paper argues that these agitations have contributed to violent rebellious reactions by aggrieved ethnic groups in the country, endangering the security, unity, and corporate existence of Nigeria as one country. It has also contributed to the alarming level of insecurity in the country. To ensure peace in the country, the State should adopt a proper fiscal federalism with appropriate system at various tiers of government, as a solution to some of the current problems confronting the country, including the insecurity it is facing now. Also if decentralization is conceived, planned, implemented, and sustained as a structural arrangement to devolve fiscal powers and responsibilities to subnational governments, then it stands strong chances of promoting peace and preventing insecurity.

Key Words: Fiscal Federalism, Fiscal Decentralisation, Insecurity, Security.

* Dept. of Economics and Development Studies, Covenant University, Nigeria

** Dept. of Economics, Caleb University, Nigeria

1. Introduction

Fiscal federalism refers to the principles that define the allocation of fiscal powers and responsibilities to the various tiers of government, while fiscal decentralization is the actual practice of the principles of fiscal federalism (Ewetan, 2012; Taiwo, 1999; Aigbokhan, 1999). There is a general consensus in the literature that the Nigerian federation is quite highly centralized, and this has been linked to long years of military rule (Elaigwu, 2007). The over centralization of powers and unhealthy struggle for control of state resources have contributed to violent intra-state conflicts and insecurity challenges that have dogged the African states that nearly turned several states, Nigeria inclusive into failed states. These conflicts involved states well endowed with natural resources. Various studies posit a close linkage between natural resources, conflict and insecurity. Scholars have therefore suggested the devolution of powers as a strategy to manage the resulting conflicts and insecurity for struggles to control state resources. Thus fiscal federalism expressed through decentralisation has become a useful conflict and insecurity mitigating mechanism by accommodating diversity and managing historical grievances with centralized government.

A federation is not about sharing revenues generated from a part, it is about creating wealth in all its parts. The current fiscal arrangement promotes indolence, militancy and insecurity, false population figures, corruption, and enriches a parasitic class. Under the Canadian constitution, the provinces and federal government legislate on natural resources and the provinces have considerable control over their own natural resources. In the US, states have control over their resources and are subject to federal taxes and laws on strategic resources. Every part of Nigeria will benefit from fiscal federalism.

The state exists primarily to provide security (Omoyibo and Akpomera, 2013; Thomas Hobbes, 1996) as aptly demonstrated by the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which specifically states that “The security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government”. Security is one of the areas fiscal federalism is being abused in Nigeria. Nigeria is the only federal system in the world that is using unitary police. Unitary police is part of the insecurity challenges in the nation. The present security challenges confronting Nigeria call to question the capacity of the federal government to manage the alarming level of insecurity in different parts of the country, in spite of huge budgetary allocation to defence and security in the

last ten years, and the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2011 (Ewetan, 2013). Despite these efforts, the level of insecurity in the country is still high, and a confirmation of this is the low ranking of Nigeria in the Global Peace Index (GPI, 2012). This has compelled the Nigerian government in recent time to request for foreign assistance from countries such as USA, Israel, and EU countries to combat the rising waves of terrorism and insecurity.

The lingering developmental challenges facing the country, particularly insecurity are traceable to over concentration of power at the centre which can be resolved by the adoption of true fiscal federalism. Despite the realization of the appropriateness of the federal system for Nigeria, stakeholders are yet to properly apply the principles of fiscal federalism to solve the numerous challenges confronting the Nigerian state (Odubajo, 2011).

Against this background, this paper therefore seeks to examine the connection between fiscal decentralization and national insecurity, a crisis of the Nigerian state.

2. Conceptual Issues

Fiscal federalism refers to the allocation of tax powers and expenditure responsibilities between the levels of government. Thus under fiscal federalism, any one individual is subject to the influence of the fiscal operations of different tiers of government (Ewetan, 2011). This is akin to what Boadway (1979) referred to as economics of multilevel or federal systems of government when he opined that the public sector is stratified into more than one level of government, each having a different set of expenditure responsibilities and taxing powers.

The term “fiscal federalism” is rooted in a political arrangement called federalism. Wheare (1963) describes federalism as “the method of dividing powers so that general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, coordinate and independent”. The fiscal relationships between and among the constituents of the federation is explained in terms of three main theories, namely, the theory of fiscal relation which concerns the functions expected to be performed by each level of government in the fiscal allocation; the theory of interjurisdictional cooperation which refers to areas of shared responsibility by the national, state and local governments, and the theory of multijurisdictional community (Tella, 1999). In this case, each jurisdiction (state, region or zone) will provide services whose benefits will accrue to people

within its boundaries, and so, should use only such sources of finance as will internalize the costs.

Decentralisation is a generic term which covers a number of modes such as the following: Deconcentration which refers to the process of administrative decentralization whereby the central government designs a structure that enables its field agents and offices to work in close proximity to the local people. Delegation which is the transfer of responsibilities from central government to semi-autonomous bodies that are directly accountable to the central government. Devolution which is the process of transferring decision-making and implementation powers, functions, responsibilities and resources to legally constituted, and popularly elected local governments. Delocalization which is the spatial distribution of central government socio-economic development facilities and activities such as schools, hospitals, etc. in peripheral regions.

There are divergent approaches to conceptualizing security which is the antithesis of insecurity. Since the cold war ended several attempts have been made to redefine the concept of security from a state-centric perspective to a broader view that makes human beings the epicenter of the concept. At the heart of this debate there have been attempts to deepen and widen the concept of security from the level of the states to societies and individuals, and from military to non-military issues (Ewetan, 2014; Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013; Kruhmann, 2003).

In the theoretical literature the divergent approaches to the conceptualization of human security are categorized into two major strands. One is a neo-realist theoretical strand that conceptualizes security as primary responsibilities of the state. The second strand, a postmodernist or plural view, conceptualizes security as the responsibilities of non-state actors and displaces the state as a major provider of security. Proponents of this approach argue that the concept of security goes beyond a military determination of threats. They are of the view that government should be more concern with the economic security of individual than the security of the state because the root causes of insecurity are economic in nature (Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013)

Some scholars in conceptualizing security placed emphasis on the absence of threats to peace, stability, national cohesion, political and socio-economic objectives of a country (Igbuzor, 2011;

Oche, 2001; Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013). In the intelligence community there is a consensus that security is not the absence of threats or security issues, but the existence of a robust mechanism to respond proactively to the challenges posed by these threats with expediency, expertise, and in real time (Ewetan, 2014).

The concept of insecurity connotes different meanings such as: absence of safety; danger; hazard; uncertainty; lack of protection, and lack of safety. According to Beland (2005) insecurity is a state of fear or anxiety due to absence or lack of protection. Achumba et al (2013) defines insecurity from two perspectives. Firstly, insecurity is the state of being open or subject to danger or threat of danger, where danger is the condition of being susceptible to harm or injury. Secondly insecurity is the state of being exposed to risk or anxiety, where anxiety is a vague unpleasant emotion that is experienced in affected by insecurity are not only uncertain or unaware of what would happen but they are also vulnerable to the threats and dangers when they occur. In the context of this paper insecurity is defined as a breach of peace and security, whether historical, religious, ethno-regional, civil, social, political that contributes to recurring conflicts, and leads to wanton destruction of lives and property.

3. Literature Review

Emuedo (2014) in a study on the greed model and insecurity in the Niger Delta, Nigeria posits that insecurity has been goaded by grievances connected to fiscal federalism rather than greed, as conflicts in the Niger Delta evolved through many stages of oppression, repression and exploitation. There are studies that establish strong link between natural resources, conflict and insecurity with oil at the apex (Khan, 1994; Karl, 1997; Coronil, 1997; Mbembe, 2001; Emuedo, 2014). Collier (1999) examines natural resource conflict nexus in his economics of civil war in natural resources endowed states. It links conflicts notably in Africa to economic driven rebellion, due to natural resources profusion. Resort to insurgency has been linked to the fact that natural resource dependent states do not embrace fiscal decentralisation, also these countries are bedeviled with a horde of economic diseases, political diseases and insecurity (Auty, 2001; Sachs and Warner, 1999; Leite and Weidemann, 1999; Gylfason, 2001). The Niger Delta conflict in Nigeria and the coercive approach by the Nigerian State instigated the violent reactions by the Niger Delta militants that led to serious security challenges until the intervention of President Yar'Adua through the amnesty declaration on June 25, 2009 to end the conflict and

stem the security challenges (Emuedo, 2014). The comparative experiences of the countries implementing decentralization, however, reveal that the relationship between decentralization and insecurity is not linear, but rather complex.

Decentralisation has not always succeeded in resolving or preventing conflicts which breed insecurity. Some scholars have expressed skepticism of the peace-making consequences of decentralization and have indeed implicated decentralization in the outbreak of conflicts and insecurity (Brubakar, 1996; Kymlicka, 1998; Synder, 2000). Decentralisation is criticized for encouraging the promotion of ethnic, regional or communal identities that are antithetical to national identity and cohesion. It has also been argued that decentralization generates conflict and insecurity. For example, Suberu (2006) argues that Nigeria's federal structure, with its multiplicity of sub-federal constituent units promotes the decentralisation and compartmentalization of ethno-religious and regional conflicts which contribute to insecurity, polarization and destabilisation of the federation.

Kauzya (2001) in a study on the links between decentralisation, peace, democracy and development argued that decentralization provides a structural arrangement and a level playing field for stakeholders and players to promote peace, security, democracy and development. Also it offers opportunities for peace in situations where power sharing can mitigate severe ethnic, religious, and territorial conflicts inside a country that could lead to insecurity.

4. Fiscal Federalism and Insecurity in Nigeria

At independence in 1960 a federal structure was imposed on Nigeria by the British. Wheare (1963) conceptualizes federalism as a constitutional division of power between two levels of government which are independent and coordinating in their respective spheres of influence. The incursion of the military into governance, and the consequent imposition of military command structure in a federation set the tone for the distortion of Nigeria's federalism. Thus the practice of federalism in Nigeria no doubt has been distorted by overwhelming dominance of the federal government that distributes national resources to lower level government at its own whims and caprices. Since independence, the demand for true fiscal federalism, fiscal and political restructuring by different ethnic nationalities in Nigeria has not abated, and these agitations have contributed to violent rebellious reactions by aggrieved ethnic groups in the country, endangering the security, unity, and corporate existence of Nigeria as one country. Federalism

that undermines the independence and autonomy of its federating units will only bring about conflict, insecurity, threat to national cohesion and peace, and ultimate disintegration (Ali, 2013; Adamu, 2005).

Fiscal decentralization has the potential to deflate national level inter-group conflict for power, resources and control, particularly in nations with diverse ethno-religious groups which are regionally concentrated. It can also improve contentious centre-periphery relations, particularly when there is a history of protest against centralized rule and forms of cultural hegemony as has been the case in both Indonesia and Nigeria (Diprose and Ukiwo, 2008). Decentralisation, when properly crafted, provides a structural arrangement through which critical issues such as those of insecurity, national unity and indivisibility can be reconciled.

Many scholars have identified strong links between fiscal federalism and different types of conflicts that breed insecurity in Nigeria (Ali, 2013; Okorie, 2011; Jega, 2002; Salawu, 2010; Onyishi, 2011; Ezeoba, 2011; Lewis, 2002). These different types of conflicts include:

Ethno-religious Conflicts: Ethno-religious violence has been linked to the inability of Nigerian leaders to distribute state resources equitably. Other causes are accusation, and allegation of neglect, oppression, domination, exploitation, victimization, discrimination, marginalization, nepotism and bigotry. In all parts of Nigeria, ethno-religious conflicts have assumed alarming rates. It has occurred in places like Shagamu (Ogun State), Lagos, Abia, Kano, Bauchi, Nassarawa, Jos, Taraba, Ebonyi and Enugu State respectively. These ethno-religious identities have become disintegrative and destructive social elements threatening the peace, stability and security in Nigeria (Eme and Onyishi, 2011).

Politically Based Violence: Violence is a universal phenomenon and the expression of hostility and rage through physical force directed against persons or property (Anifowoshe, 1982; Alanamu, 2005; Fakanbi and Raji, 2013). The aggression theory which postulates that frustration breeds aggression has been used to explain the discontent and frustration of the different components of Nigeria, especially the minorities with the refusal of the Nigerian state to embrace fiscal federalism (Anifowoshe, 1982). These frustrations are largely responsible for the various violence and insecurity problem that have been witnessed for some time in different parts of

Nigeria. Because of the centralization of resources political contests are characterized by desperation, and violent struggle for political power among politicians. Recurring political violence in Nigeria could be attributed to over-zealousness and desperation of political gladiators to win elections or remain in office at all cost.

Economic-Based Violence: Eme and Onyishi (2011) note that cries of resource control and revenue sharing regularly rent the air between proponents and opponents also leading to violent agitations among the contending actors and insecurity challenges. The Niger-Delta crisis in Nigeria presents a classic case of this violent struggle that has been on since the end of the Nigerian civil war in 1970. Although by no means limited to oil in the Niger Delta, the most prevalent campaign about the link between fiscal federalism and insecurity in Nigeria focuses on oil and the Delta region. It is however true those other types of resource driven conflicts have received less attention in the debate. Assets such as grazing and farming, and water resource, have tended to give rise to horizontal conflicts that involve communities across the geo-political zones.

Organized violent groups: Organized violent groups such as ethnic militia, vigilantes, secret cults in tertiary institutions and political thugs contribute significantly to security challenges in Nigeria in different dimension and forms. Their emergence have been linked to a number of factors which include the culture of militarism that has its antecedents in military rule, the failure of the state and its institutions, economic disempowerment, the structure of the state and Nigeria's federalism, non-separation of state and religion, politics of exclusion, culture of patriarchy, ignorance and poor political consciousness (Ibrahim and Igbuzor, 2002 as cited in Eme and Onyishi, 2011).

Weak Security System: This is a major contributory factor to the level of insecurity in Nigeria, and this can be attributed to a number of factors which include, a unitary police force for a federation like Nigeria, inadequate funding of the police and other security agencies, lack of modern equipment both in weaponry and training, poor welfare of security personnel, and inadequate personnel (Achumba et al. 2013). Nigeria is the only federal system in the world that is using unitary police. Unitary police is part of the insecurity challenges in the nation. According to Olonisakin (2008) the police-population ratio in Nigeria is 1:450 which falls below

the standard set by the United Nations. The implication of this is that Nigeria is grossly under policed and this partly explains the inability of the Nigerian Police Force to effectively combat crimes and criminality in the country. Dimensions of insecurity include crime, criminality, armed robbery and insurgency. The level of insecurity in Nigeria is alarming. The table below shows available data on the level of some of the crimes from 2000-2008.

Table 1: Level of Crimes from 2000 to 2008

Year	Theft	Armed Robbery	Kidnapping	Assassination	Fraud
2000	29127	1877	243	1255	7927
2001	40796	2809	349	2120	10234
2002	35231	3889	337	2117	9134
2003	33124	3497	410	2136	9508
2004	37289	3142	349	2550	9532
2005	46111	2074	798	2074	9580
2006	41901	2863	372	2000	6395
2007	21082	2327	277	2007	5860
2008	23927	2340	309	1956	5058

Source: Adapted from Achumba et al. (2013)

Table 1 shows that on the average the rate of all the insecurity variables increased between 2000 and 2008 with the exception of fraud which decreased within the same period. In recent time there has been an increase in the rate of theft, armed robbery especially in the banks, kidnapping and assassination in different parts of the country. However these vices are not equally distributed in the country. For instance, the South East states of Nigeria have the highest incidence of kidnapping, the South South states of Nigeria have the highest incidence of armed robbery and fraud, while the Northern states are characterized by bombing by the Islamic sect, Boko Haram (CLEEN, 2012).

Available data on the violent attacks of Boko Haram from 2009 to 2012 are reported in Table 2

Table 2. Attacks by Boko Haram Sect in Nigeria from 2009 to 2012

S/N	Date of Attack	State	Location of Attack	Impact
1	July 27, 2009	Yobe	Attack on Potiskum, Yobe State Divisional Headquarters.	4 people killed
2	March 13, 2018	Plateau	Another sect operation in the northern part of Jos, Plateau State.	300 people killed
3	Oct. 1 2010	Abuja	Explosions near the Eagle Square, Abuja.	12 people killed and many injured
4	Dec. 24,	Plateau	A bomb attack, in BarkinLadi, Jos, Plateau	8 people killed

	2010		State.	
5	Dec, 31, 2010	Abuja	Explosions in Mogadishu Mammy Market, Abuja.	10 people killed
6	Jan. 21, 2011	Borno	Attack on Borno state Governorship candidate of all Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), for the 2011 election, AlhajiModuGubio.	7 people killed
7	Mar. 2, 2011	Kaduna	Boko Haram killed policemen attached to the Residence of Mustapha Sandamu, at Rigasa	2 people killed
8	Mar. 30, 2011	Yobe	Bomb planted by Boko Haram in Damaturu, YobeState, exploded and injured police officer.	1 injured
9	April 8, 2011	Niger	Bomb at INEC office in Suleja	8 people killed
10	April 26, 2011	Bauchi	Army Barracks in Bauchi bombed	3 people killed And many injured
11	May 29, 2011	Abuja Bauchi And Zaria	Multiple bombings in different locations in Northern Nigeria.	13 people killed And 40 injured
12	June 7, 2011	Borno	Series of bomb blasts occurred in Maiduguri	5 killed and several injured
13	June 16, 2011	Abuja and Borno	Nigerian Police Headquarters, Abuja, bombed by A suspected suicide bomber. A bomb blast also Occurred at Damboa town, Maiduguri	7 killed and many Vehicles damaged
14	June 20, 2011	Kaduna	Boko Haram stormed Kankara Police station in Katsina state.	7 policemen killed and 2 security men
15	July 9, 2011	Borno and Niger	A clash between Boko Haram and the military in Maiduguri, Borno State, also in Suleja, Niger State, a bomb was targeted at a church.	35 killed and many injured
16	July 12, 2011	Borno	Boko Haram threw an explosive device on a moving Military patrol vehicle	5 people killed
17	July 15, 2011	Borno	Explosion in Maiduguri.	5 people injured
18	July 25, 2011	Maiduguri	Bomb explosion near the palace of traditional ruler in Maiduguri.	8 people killed
19	Aug. 26, 2011	Abuja	A suicide Bomber drove into The United Nations building in Abuja	25 people killed and 60 injured
20	Sep. 12, 2011	Bauchi	A bomb attack on a police station in Misau	7 people killed
21	Sep. 17, 2011	Borno	Brother in-law of Mohammed Yusuf, the slain leader of Boko Haram, BabakuraFugu, shot dead in front of his house in Maiduguri by two members of the sect two days after he was visited by former President OlusegunObasanjo.	1 person killed
22	Oct. 3, 2011	Borno	Boko Haram attacked Baga Market in Maiduguri	3 people killed
23	Nov. 4, 2011	Yobe	Attack by Boko Haram in Damaturu, Yobe state.	150 people killed
24	Nov. 27, 2011	Yobe	Attacks in Gendam.	7 people killed
25	Dec. 24 2011	Plateau	Bombings in Jos.	80 people killed

26	Dec. 25, 2011	Niger	Christmas Day bombing in Madalla.	50 people killed
27	Jan. 6, 2012	Adamawa	Christ Apostolic Church was attacked and Igbo People were also killed in Mubi in the same state	37 people killed
28	Jan. 20, 2012	Kano	Multiple attacks in Kano.	150 people killed
29	Jan. 26, 2012	Kano	The SabonGari of Kano State witnessed another Explosion, which caused another pandemonium in the state.	Many injured and Some luxury buses damaged
30	Feb. 7, 2012	Kano	A bomb blast in Kano market and military barracks	5 people killed
31	April 8, 2012	Kaduna	Easter Day Church bombing.	38 people killed
32	June 17, 2012	Kaduna	Multiple attacks on churches.	12 people killed and 80 injured
33	Aug. 7, 2012	Kogi	Deeper Life Church.	19 people killed

Source: Adapted from Achumba et al. (2013)

The data in Table 2 above illustrate graphically the high level of insecurity in Nigeria from 2009 to 2012, and this situation has not improved but rather it is getting worse.

5. Conclusion and Recommendation

Fiscal federalism is such a critical issue in Nigeria, such that it has become more contentious in the fourth republic. Agitation for the practice of true fiscal federalism has therefore become a thorny issue in Nigeria. The South-South and the South-West people are clamoring for fiscal federalism while the North is vehemently opposed against the adoption of fiscal federalism. This agitation has gone beyond verbal contest as it has witnessed militancy and kidnapping in the Niger Delta which has contributed to the alarming level of insecurity in the country. If decentralization is conceived, planned, implemented, and sustained as a structural arrangement to devolve fiscal powers and responsibilities to subnational governments, then it stands strong chances of promoting peace and preventing insecurity.

If Nigeria adopts a proper fiscal federalism with appropriate system at various tiers of government, it could offer the needed solution to some of the current problems confronting the country, including the insecurity it is facing now. Therefore power must be devolved appropriately to sub national government to reverse the centralization of power over the years which has brought Nigeria where it is now.

References

- Aigbokhan, B. E., (1999). Fiscal Federalism and Economic Growth in Nigeria in: Fiscal Federalism and Nigeria's Economic Development. Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Nigerian Economic Society, 333-352.
- Achumba, I. C., Ighomereho, O. S., & Akpan-Robaro, M. O. M, 2013, Security Challenges in Nigeria and the Implications for Business Activities and Sustainable Development, Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, 4(2), pp79-99.
- Adamu, A. (2005). True Federalism in the 21st Century Nigeria. A Lecture Delivered at University of Jos Alumni Association, Lagos, 24th March.
- Ali, A. D., 2013, Security and Economic Development in Nigeria since 1960. Kuwait Chapter of Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review, 2(6), pp1-7.
- Auty, R. M., (2001). Resource Abundance and Economic Development. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Beland, D. (2005). The Political Construction of Collective Insecurity: From Moral Panic to Blame Avoidance and Organized Irresponsibility. Center for European Studies, Working Paper Series 126.
- Boadway, R. W., (1979). Public Sector Economics. Winthrop Publishers, Inc. Cambridge.
- Brubakar, R. (1996). Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in New Europe. Cambridge University Press: New York.
- CLEEN Foundation (2012). Summary of Findings of 2012 National Crime and Safety Survey, Retrieved From: <E:/summary-of-findings-of-2012-national.html>.
- Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.
- Coronil, F. (1997). The Magical State, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Elaigwu, J. S. (2007). Nigeria: The Current State of the Federation: Some Basic Challenges. Paper Presented at International Conference on Federalism Organized by the Institute of Governmental Relations, Queens University, Kingston, Canada, Oct 18-21.
- Eme, O. I., & Onyishi, A., 2011, The Challenges of Insecurity in Nigeria: A Thematic Exposition. Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business, 3(8), pp172-184.
- Emuedo, C., 2014, Oil and Conflict Nexus: The Greed Model and Insecurity in the Niger Delta, Nigeria.

- Global Journal of Human-Social Science and Political Science, 14(4), pp6-16.
- Ewetan, O. O., & Urhie, E., 2014, Insecurity and Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria. Journal of Sustainable Development Studies, 5(1), pp40-63.
- Ewetan, O. O. (2013). Insecurity and Socio-Economic Development: Perspectives on the Nigerian Experience. A lecture Delivered at St. Timothy Anglican Church, Sango-Ota, Ogun State, 15th February.
- Ewetan, O. O., 2012, Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria: Theory and Practice. International Journal of Development and Sustainability, 1(3), pp1075-1087.
- Ewetan, O. O. (2011). Fiscal Federalism and Macroeconomic Performance in Nigeria. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Covenant University, Ota.
- Ezeoba, S. L., 2011, Causes and Effects of Insecurity in Nigeria. The National Scholar, 8(2), pp 28-38.
- Diprose, R., & Ukiwo, U. (2008). Decentralisation and Conflict Management in Indonesia and Nigeria. Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE Working Paper, No. 49 February.
- Global Peace Index (GPI, 2012). Global Peace Ranking. Institute for Economic and Peace, Retrieved From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
- Gylfason, T., 2001, Nature, Power and Growth. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 48(5), pp558-588.
- Hobbes, T. (1996). Leviathan, edited by J. C. A. Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 104.
- Human Development Report (Various Issues).
- Ibrahim, J., & Igbuzor, O. (2002). "Memorandum Submitted to the Presidential Committee on National Security in Nigeria".
- Igbuzor, O., 2011, Peace and Security Education: A Critical Factor for Sustainable Peace and National Development. International Journal of Peace and Development Studies, 2(1), pp1-7.
- Jega, I., 2002, Tackling Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria. Newsletter of Social Science Academy of Nigeria, September, 5(2), pp35-38.
- Karl, T. (1997). The Paradox of Plenty. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kauzya, John-Mary. (2001). Decentralization: Prospects for Peace, Democracy and Development. In:

Decentralized Governance for Democracy, Peace, Development and Effective Service Delivery.
A

Publication by Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York, NY
10017,
USA.

Khan, S. A. (1994). Nigeria: The Political Economy of Oil. London: Oxford University Press.
Krahman, E., 2003, Conceptualizing Security and Governance. Journal of the Nordic
International

Studies Association, 38(1), pp5-26

Kufour, J. (2012). Nigeria: Imbalanced Development Causes Insecurity in Nigeria, Thisday
Newspaper,
Lagos.

Kymlicka, W. (1998). Is Federalism an Alternative to Secession? In Percy, B. L. ed., Theories of
Secession. Routledge Press: New York.

Leite, C., & Weidmann, J. (1999). Does Mother Nature Corrupt?. IMF Working Paper.
Washington DC,
IMF.

Lewis, P. M. (2002). Islam, Protest, and Conflict in Nigeria. Washington Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), Africa Notes, No. 10.

Mbembe, A. (2001). On the Postcolony. California: University of California Press.

National Bureau of Statistics. (2009). Social Statistics in Nigeria. Abuja: The NBS Publication.

Nnoli, O. (1981). Path to Nigerian Development, Dakar: CODESRIA.

Nwanegbo, C. J., & Odigbo, J., 2013. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science,
3(4),
pp285-291.

Oche, O. (2001). Democratization and the Management of African Security. In Akindele, R. and
Ate, B.

(eds) in Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, 13(1), Lagos, NIIA.

Odubajo, A., 2011, An Exploration of Contending Issues in Nigeria's Federal Practice. Journal
of

Alternative Perspectives in the Social Science, 3(1), pp1-33.

Okorie, I. (2011). "Insecurity Consequences for Investment and Employment". The Punch
Newspaper,
Thursday, September 9, 37-38.

Olonisakin, F. (2008). "In the Line of Fire", BBC Focus on Africa, (April-June), pp19-23.

Omoyibo, K. U., & Akpomera, E., 2013, Insecurity Mantra: The Paradox of Nigerian Growth and
Development. European Scientific Journal, 8(15), pp132-142.

Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (1999). Nature Resource Intensity and Economic Growth. In:
Development

Policies in Natural Resource Economies, eds. Jorg, M., Brian, C., AyishaFarooq, C., & Edward, E.,
13-38.

Salawu, B., 2010, Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: Causal Analysis and Proposals for New Management Strategies. *European Journal of Social Sciences*, 13(3), pp345-353.

Sampson, I. T., & Onuoha, F. C., 2011, Forcing the Horse to Drink or Making it Realise its Thirst?

Understanding the Enactment of Anti-Terrorism Legislation (ATL) in Nigeria. Perspectives on
Terrorism, 5, pp 3-4.

Suberu, R. (2006). *Federal Dilemma in Africa: The Nigerian Experience in Comparative Perspective*.

Conference paper presented at the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity

(CRISE) Conference on Federalism, Decentralisation, and Conflict, University of Oxford, October
2006.

Snyder, J. (2000). *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Ethnic Conflict*. W. W. Norton: New
York.

Taiwo, I. O. (1999). Fiscal Federalism: A Theoretical Framework. In: *Fiscal Federalism and Nigeria's
Economic Development*. Proceedings of the annual Conference of the Nigerian Economic
Society,
3-23

Tella, S. A. (1999). Promoting States Economic Independence through Financial Market Cooperation. In:

Fiscal Federalism and Nigeria's Economic Development. Proceedings of the annual
Conference of
the Nigeria Economic Society, 171-187.

Where, K. C. (1963). *Federal Government*, 4th edition. New York: Oxford University Press.