THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF UTTARAKHAND SEPARATE STATE MOVEMENT

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Abstract
Why are social movements important, sociologically? Though there are doubtless many reasons, there will focus upon three. In the first instance, social movements are extremely prevalent in contemporary western societies. Evidence of their activities is everywhere. Protests are one very obvious example of this.

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No one rarely open a newspaper or turn on the TV news without being informed of an act of protest somewhere in the world. In addition to protest, movements fill the smaller crevices of our life world in a multitude of ways. Most social science students, for example, will at some time have confronted the nature or nurture question in relation to specific aspects of behavior, such as gender roles. For some this may have seemed like a formal academic exercise but it can hardly have escaped the attention of many that these debates were provoked by the work of feminist writers, that is, writers who belong to a social movement and who have brought their movement concerns to bear in their academic work. Similarly, many students will at one time or another have had to confront the choice of whether to use female or male pronouns in their work, and he or she will be aware that this dilemma has been provoked by the work of feminist authors who have sought to challenge the dominant masculine norm.

Finally, outside the academy, many of us have cultivated the habits of, for example, taking a portion of our household rubbish to recycling centers, using our cars less or buying an anti-perspirant which does not contain harmful CFC gasses. This is a small gesture but it is one very much shaped by the activities of the environmental movement. Indeed, it is an activity of the environmental movement. Part of the movement in social movements is a transformation in the habits, including linguistic and basic domestic habits that shape our everyday lives.

This prevalence makes social movements important for sociology because it demonstrates that movements are an important constituent element in the world that we seek to examine and explain. A science of society and social relations can no more skip to study movements than it could the family, economy or state.

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At a more specific level, movements are important because they are key agents for bringing about change within societies. Immediately this conjures up an image of revolution or major governmental change. This happens but it is comparatively rare and the kinds of changes movements achieve are more often local and cultural in nature (McAdam 1994). Movements problematize the ways in which we live our lives and, as noted above, call for changes in our habits of thought, action and interpretation. The point, they are, in themselves, manifestations of social change. Societies are not static or stable. They flow. And social movements are key currents within this flow.

Not those changes are always intended. Movement actions trigger chains of events which cannot always be foreseen or controlled and they sometimes provoke backlashes and other unintended responses. These processes of change and movement are important from a sociological point of view because the discipline revolves around questions of steadiness and change: the problem of order and the problem of transformation. Social movements are not the only cause of change (or, for that matter, in the case of conservative movements, order (but it would be foolhardy to ignore them if these issues are of importance to us. There is another aspect to this question of change. The question of change, particularly change by way of movement politics, is a question about the difference which social agents themselves can make to the various structural dimensions of their life, a question about the form and distribution of power in society and the sufficiency and limits of democracy. Social movements are, in effect, natural experiments in power, legitimation and democracy. Their existence, successes, failures and more generally their dynamics, though all extremely difficult to read and interpret, allow us to gauge the workings of the broader political structures of our society. This is the third reason why movements are important.

The researchers of Indian federalism have concluded the fact of regionalism in India from several socio-economic viewpoints. Most of them have identified the factors that generally have a tendency to foment regional feelings. For example, some political scientists such as Iqbal Narain (1976) have ascribed the growth of regional feeling to the opinion of relative socio-economic lack in the people of an exacting area or region. They maintain that such an insight makes it easier for the centrifugal forces to get uttered and declare themselves in an organized manner.

Though it might be factual, and true to an immense degree, it is attractive that more often than not, the centrifugal pulls have been strongest in regions where comparatively speaking much economic development has taken place (Punjab, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu etc.), and they are sometimes weakest in the economically least developed regions (UP and Bihar). Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, together account for the region where regional pulls have been weakest, and it is in these States where regional exclusivity is also weakest when viewed in terms of demands for political self-government etc. by the way demographer Ashis Bose refers to this group of States within an acronym BIMARU representative of their sick state of socio-economic indicators.

It seems that while the economic issue is an important factors in this connection, there must be some supplementary factors which make it easier for the guidance to mobilize the people in a particular area, and equally the lack of the same factors also makes it comparatively more difficult for a control to produce strong centrifugal pulls, even though the economic factors may be a favorable factor.
This would therefore be quite an appealing exercise to find out such factors as are vital (in addition to the economic factor) for mobilization of the ample in a particular area or region for regional purposes. In other words, one may retain that while the economic factor may be an essential factor, it may not be the adequate factors to produce regional pulls, to understand some of the other subjective and purpose factors that may be essential for a large-scale mobilization on regional issues.

Apart from the all problems, the procedure of production, deconstruction and rebuilding of local identities in India is bound to persist in spite of all talk of globalization, and the world quick suitable a global village. The image of a global village in fact reinforces the need to recognize, more and more, with one’s local individuality, lest one is lost in the apparently continuous limitations of the global village. Scholars in a compilation published under the title Globalization and the Region) have argued that area would become even more concerned in the perspective of globalization as the personally is likely to use province as an active kind to resist his/her marginalization in the globalized world. The growing fuzziness of the nation-state may certainly make provincial identities look even more rational. The author genuinely believes that in the final analysis the development of an identity by a region helps the region in its development on all fronts economic, political and even psychic.

Unless a region grown some kind of a local patriotism, it is intricate for its population to conquer the psychosomatic disadvantages that have overwhelmed them for centuries. The feeling of local harmony might be as imaginary as that of patriotism, but just as the latter helps support the nation, the local identity also makes the course of growth less tender.

By the scarcity of a local individuality that at least partially, is accountable for the neglect of the whole of UP by the succeeding Planning Commissions set up by the Central Government. Whereas most other States could grow provincial loyalty and even local conceit, the State of UP, in the lack of such individuality, has lagged after. No mobilization of the lot people was ever likely. Even Hariyana (Kumar: 1991) and Himachal Pradesh progressed much quicker once they grown local conceit as a result of separate Statehood. In fact far from being essentially prejudiced (even, nationalism for that reason can deteriorate into prejudice), local conceit liberates people from the control of psychosomatic repression and lowliness complexes which have been products of centuries of financial backwardness.

Greatly the history, culture and writing of these regions in UP have remained imprecise in the lack of leaders who could make the people experience conceited of their province. While the Punjabi and Haryanavi farmers feel they are feeding the country, the UP-laborer’s working in the farming fields of these States just get noticed as bhaiyyas, devoid of any pride and movement. The hill dwellers from the State similarly stay domestic servants and Bhanmajuas (Sah: 1997). This is the land-owning farmers who get termed as hard working. In the deficiency of this local conceit much of the reporting on UP that one gets in the national newspapers is mainly on the lines of the Western media commenting on Third World countries, viz., importance their problems of overpopulation, backwardness, incompetence, and ignoring the structural reasons. But while there is a Government of India counter stability this Western insight, there is barely any effort by the UP Government to do so.
In spite of over the years the people in UP have grown a suspicion and have come to consider that they are unable of forging in front in the deficiency of some energizing. The State as a result gets reported in the media as part of a cow belt with sleepy towns. Ashis Bose, the well-known demographer, refers to it as one of the BIMARU States, a reduction which includes Bihar, MP, Rajasthan, besides UP, with of way a derogatory tone. (The acronym in Hindi literally means not well). It is hoped that forming of in individuality may help the province come out of this complex and cynicism. This is exactly supposed that identity as a superficial boundary of social categories . . . acts as a conduit for channelizing motivational sentiments into a mobilization fact”. (Dimri: 1997: 22).

The characteristics are consequently not an epiphenomenon based on ancient, irrational, out of date criteria, distinctive of a conventional civilization, as is occasionally made out by the middle-class-upwardly-mobilize-elite. On the opposing, the formation of characteristics is further typical of a society rapid touching up on the development path to catch up with the better off regions. In other words it has been instrumental in making people announce on issues of survival and existence. Yet the Non-Resident Indians or Africans in the US, when they join on these racial lines, the mobilization is not completely sentimental, but has enormous substance worth as these identities, whosoever fuzzy and irrational in conditions of their socio-economic content, remain instrumental in making these assertions efficient.

It might yet be true of several characteristics e.g. the Asians in the European society, the blacks in the US and the Chinese in t the South-East Asia. In 2000 the federal map of India was representing to generate three new States, representative a noteworthy move in the position of many of India’s chief political parties in the direction of self-protective reorganization. A new period in the political economy of India (connected with economic liberalization; the development of the Hindu Right; the regionalization of politics; and the appearance of a coalitional system of government in New Delhi) (provide a new field of opportunities for regions demanding State recognition. In this consideration, the chief political parties are mainly by convenience and opportunism somewhat, as is asserted, by an assessment of the democratic and developmental probable of smaller States.

The nature of India’s federalism is central to any consideration of its political economy (Corbridge, 1995). Analyses of federalism in India have tended to point on its Constitutional necessities; the shifting political financial system of Centre-State dealings; and the difficulties to the states federalist claims, evinced most clearly in the secessionist movements in Punjab, Kashmir and the North East. A issue which has taken a somewhat poorer outline since years (the formation of new federal States within the Union of India.

In the year 2000 the map of India war has redrawn in the respect of three new States (Uttaranchal, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. The formation of these States is attractive because traditionally the chief political parties have tended to resist the development of new States in India. Not likewise Nigeria, which has a history of tactically separating and increasing the number of its inner units (Dent, 1995); changes to India’s domestic political-administrative limitations over the last fifty years have frequently been approved only after considerable resist.

Following central Governments have tended to view assertions of local individuality with doubt, and to stigmatize them as slender, chauvinist and even anti-national (Oommen,
1990a). The reasons for this consist of the worrying inheritance of the Separation in 1947; the apprehension that India may divided under the weight of its divided imposing history; and its total racial, linguistic, spiritual and cultural multiplicity. While alterations and accompaniments to India's States have been made over the past fifty years, until newly New Delhi has tended to permit these margin changes only reluctantly, and neither did such movements and demands tend to accept national-level sustain from clash parties. Thus, the political map of India today remains occupied by crowded, geographically gigantic, and culturally diverse mega-States like Uttar Pradesh, which, with over 160 million people, is demographically bigger than many large countries (Arora and Verney, 1992). Development of the new States marks a departure in political attitudes at the Centre in two main ways.

First, somewhat than resisting the demands for new States, many of the major political actors at the Centre (recent Governments, their union parties and conflict parties) supported some or all of the local movements. This sustainability was frequently both contradictory and fragile (a change in the political equation in one of the areas under conversation would see a setback of notice, foot-dragging or even an obvious change of heart on the subject. There were also discrepancies on the issue between different levels and units of particular parties. But the quantity and dependability of sustain is in some ways inappropriate. What is essential here is the fact that self-protective change has become a permissible issue for party agendas (debates over defensive reorganization have re-entered mainstream political argument in the mid-/late 1990s.

The second point of exit is that these new States were planned on the grounds of administrative effectiveness rather than on the verbal communication standard that has, apparently, guided State development the past (Brass, 1994; King, 1997). This too marks a shift in India's central beliefs, as local identity, culture and ecological dissimilarity would now emerge to be familiar as a suitable foundation for law-making separation and political depiction. This difference between past and present is fuzzier than suggested here, but there has unquestionably been a qualitative shift in the approach in the direction of new States between the big political parties at the Centre.

It does not have an intension at separate local mobilizations or their outcomes in precise areas (even though this line of examination does potentially offer essential insights into an entire sort of issues around authority, state and civil society. It is concerned with exploring the association among the shift in attitudes in New Delhi to the issue of new States, and the changing political economy of India. If a broad periodization of post-Independence India’s political economy can be charted, then it would seem clear that a third era is in progress, following on from the Nehruvian years, and then the Indira/decline of Congress period (Yadav, 1999).

This new period is largely noticeable by the post-1991 liberalization of the economy, the dramatic rise of the Hindu Right, and a move from one-party supremacy of the Centre to the emergence of a moderately stable system of union government (if much less so a steadiness of the coalitions themselves). Related to this is the regionalization of politics, whereby minor regional and State-specific parties have come to wield more authority not
just in the States themselves (in government, or t, or as partners of national parties), but also in the national congregation itself (Saez, 2002).

References