

## Indian Nuclear Warheads and Its Strategies About Their Nuclear Policy

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**Abstract:** This article aims to investigate and evaluate the accomplishment of India's nuclear strategy to discover and make sense of the protracted journey of India with nuclear warheads towards the state. The Nuclear Programme and Policy of India has long been tied with its goal of worldwide recognition and respect. Moreover, India acknowledges a successful and responsible nuclear state in its global Security and Defence Policy. India's first use is no. Repression is a moral and cultural risk that is only worthy of the nuclear philosophy of our culture and tradition. At least three new aircraft, ground-based systems and marine systems are already in construction in India to complement or replace existing nuclear capability aircraft, which continues to modernize its nuclear stockpile. Many of these technologies are soon to be completed and willing to battle. It is believed that India constructed 150 to 160 nuclear bombs, but probably just 150, with adequate military plutonium. However, extra plutonium would be needed in the fabrication of missile warheads, and India supposedly develops many more plutonium plants, which are presently being built. India's nuclear policy, historically centered in Pakistan, is now focusing more on China, and Beijing now includes Indian missiles.

**Keywords:** India, Nuclear Warheads, Strategies, Pakistan, China, Policy, Missiles, etc.

### **Introduction:**

India is continuing to refurbish and operationalize its arsenal of nuclear warheads. We believe that India now employs 8 nuclear-powered systems: two aero planes, four ballistic rockets on land, and two ballistic rockets on sea. Three more systems are being developed, many of which are near completion and will be ready for action shortly. The range of Indian ballistic missiles in Beijing is now available. The number of warheads of plutonium in India is thought to have been around 600 kg, enough for 150–200 nuclear warheads; however, not all this material has been transformed into nuclear warheads. We believe that India has developed 150 nuclear warheads based on the information about its nuclear power delivery organization and strategy. More warheads will be needed to aromatize the missile systems it is constructing.

India wants to develop a minimum of one reactor of plutonium production in addition to the operating Dhruva Plutonium Production Reactor at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center in the vicinity of Mumbai. The unprotected, 500 MW Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor under construction at the Indira Gandhi Centre, near Kalpakkam, could possibly significantly increase India's plutonium production capacity in the coming years, if it achieves criticality as planned in 2020, adding to the estimated 5,400 kilo reactor grade plutonium from India's strategic stockpile. The Research Center Director further predicted that in the next 15 years six more rapid breeder reactors will go on-line. It is reported that the first two construction, which would be placed in the center, will be complete by the early 2030s to provide commercial electricity.

**Objective:**In this topic we deeply talk about Policy on Nuclear Warheads, Ballistic Missiles launched from land, Cruise Missiles (sometimes known as anti-ship missiles), Ballistic Missiles launched from the sea, India's Nuclear Policy Strategy (1. Nuclear Policy with No First Use, 2. The Doctrine of the Least Credible Deterrent)

**Policy on Nuclear Warheads:**

One of the world's most serious nuclear hotspots is tensions between India and Pakistan. Although India's main connection of deterrence is with Pakistan, its nuclear upgrading shows its future strategic interactions with China are becoming increasingly important. The main aim is China, as all new Agni rockets have ranges. This position is probably strengthened during the 2017 Dhoklam standstill along the Bhutanese border, when Chinese and Indian soldiers were highly alerted to the disputes. Tension remained high on both sides of the border and troop injuries. The development of the Indian nuclear position in order to take into consideration a conventional and nuclear China superior would lead to the deployment of substantial new capabilities within the next ten years which might also affect how India perceives the role of its nuclear warheads against Pakistan. India needs strength to really threaten secure reprisals against China, so that it may pursue more aggressive policies such as escalating domination or a magnificent first strike on Pakistan. India has been pursuing a nuclear no first use strategy for a long time yet India's 2003 Declaration that nuclear warheads may be used in reaction to chemical or biological strikes has weakened its strategy. Yet the Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar said India should not be linked to it in the 2016 disagreement with Pakistan. Although the Indian government subsequently stated that the Minister's comments were his own opinions, the discussion underlined the conditions under which India considered using nuclear warheads. In the future, the situation will depend on what happens. India's commitment to its policy of no-first use has been further brought into doubt by recent scholarship, with analysts saying that India's NFU policy is not a stable or trustworthy predictor of how nuclear warheads may be really used by Indians' military and political leaders.

**Ballistic Missiles launched from Land:**

India possesses four different types of ballistic missiles that look operational: Prithvi-II and Agni-I short-range, Agni-II medium-range, and Agni III-IV intermediate-range. Agni V are in development and are about to be finished at least two further greater range of Agni missiles.



The number of such rockets India wants to maintain in its arsenal remains to be seen. Some can serve as projects for technological development for long-range missiles. While the Government of India has not made declarations on the future size or composition of its land-based missile arsenal, short-range and redundant missile types may have been suspended, with future-focused mixed strike options only medium and long-range missiles. Otherwise, a diversified missile force seems to be being planned by the government to maintain and operate.

India's ballistic missile technology has also been transformed into a satellite interceptor. A first successful satellite test is carried out (Mission Shakti) against one of its own satellites by the Organization for Defence Research and Development. It was a three-stage missile with two solid missile boosters, adopted from the Indian Ministry of Defense design, according to the Indigenous Ministry of Defence. The satellite's demise caused hundreds of pieces of enormous debris field. And when the earth's atmosphere had mostly re-entered, the impact blasted others into higher orbit. Unknown military sources in India have also stated that the interceptor probably uses the Agni-V ballistic missile propulsion technology which remains in construction.

**Cruise Missiles (sometimes known as anti-ship missiles):**

The Nirbhaya cruise missile is being developed in India. The missile looks like the US Tomahawk or the Pakistani Babur and might be designed to be used in air and water. Nirbhaya was the first indigenous subsonic cruise missile to be conceived and constructed by India with a range of 1,000 kilometers and capable of carrying up to 300 kg of warheads. Following a number of unsuccessful flight tests dating back to 2013, some of the technical issues have been overcome in November 2017.



Since there are numerous reports of the double-capability of the Nirbhaya, neither the Indian government nor the American intelligence services has made this public. An indigenous power source is planned to test the Nirbhaya cruise missile. However, it seems as a postponement. The Defense Research and Development Organization verified the early phases of the planning and development of new variations of Nirbhaya's cruise missile including submarine launched and airborne models.

**Ballistic Missiles launched from the Sea:**

India is operating a nuclear missile that has been started and has been fired by a submarine and is constructing a second ballistic missile that is launched by a submarine, to be used in a small fleet of nuclear missile submarines.



A 400-kilometer one-story liquid fuel ballistic missile, a close-range missile for the launch from rear of two specially equipped Sukanya Class ships, each ship may carry two missiles. The Dhanush is a ship based ballistic missile. The Dhanush is the Prithvi-II ship-based version. In February 2018, the latest test launch took place.

Dhanush's use as a strategic dissuasive warhead is severely constrained by very little scope and would be exposed to a serious risk of being sailed close to the shores of Pakistan or China for the purpose of targeting infrastructure in these countries. In 2016 INS Arihant was commissioned to be the first indigenous nuclear-powered submarine for ballistic missiles (SSBN) in India, but reentered most of 2017 and its propulsion system after water damage crippled the first part of 2018. In November 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that his first deterrent patrol had been performed by the Arihant and that the India nuclear tiny had officially been completed. He also added that the deployment provided an appropriate answer to those who accept nuclear challenging. Although the fact that the ship was really equipped with atomic warheads is uncertain. In August 2018, Arihant did two underwent unit tests of K-15 nuclear-capable missiles, however the Arihant was indicated primarily as a training vessel and the technological demonstration device and not as new SSBNs were put in operation for the nuclear deterrence patrols. On November 19, 2017 the SSBN INS Arihant, which should be launched into the Indian Navy soon.

To arm the SSBNs, India created and works on one nuclear-friendly ballistic missile fired by sea: the present 700 km submarine-launched SLBM, K-15 and the prospective K-4 SLBM with a range of around 3500 km. The comparatively narrow range of the K-15 would not enable the SSBNs to focus on Islamabad alone, southern Pakistan. Unless they travelled deep into the South China Sea, the submarines could never hit China.

### **India's Nuclear Policy Strategy:**

The focus of India's nuclear-based external policy on nuclear power was multi-faced. The founding fathers of India's foreign policy have been adopted as one of India's responsible nuclear countries through the diversified nuclear strategy.

#### **1. The Doctrine of the Least Credible Deterrent:**

India followed another important nuclear strategy, generally known as credible nuclear minimum deterrence measures, at the outset of Pokhran II. This is a sort of unofficial ideology, which emphasizes that no first use (NFU) with a safe ability to strike seconds.

The ideology objectively shows its commitment to use significant nuclear capabilities as tools of redistribute in the event of disruption in contrast with reciprocal annihilation. On 17 August 1999, a former secretary of the National Security Advisory Board formally stated this abovementioned nuclear policy. This nuclear strategy, though, has not only produced an image of India as a leading nuclear power but has also led to the reassuring of China and the US of strategic stability in South Asia. This concept also raised questions about the maturity of the Indian and civic leadership. The Indian idea of minimal deterrence enables a huge quantity of sophisticated warheads not to be used to prevent nuclear opponents from being ready to act effectively.

## **2. Nuclear Policy with No First Use:**

India has implemented a nuclear Defence policy, commonly referred to as nuclear non-first use policy. This is the basis of the official nuclear policy of India. Firstly, after its second nuclear test, India established this strategy - Pokhran II, 1998. The Indian government published the draught doctrine, similarly a year later, that would only mention India as pursuing a policy of self-repression. India has no other alternative than to continue farther down a nuclear road for national security interests, and adopts a purely defensive nuclear strategy for the first time. In addition, the country's affirmative ideology of January 2003 involves the suspension of nuclear testing, non-exportation of nuclear technology and worldwide nuclear disarmament. This impression of India was demonstrated by the Indian diplomats, government spokesmen and other strategists as a responsible nuclear state and work as a vital ingredient in the Indian nuclear position. NFU policy has been used to represent India as a responsible country by Indian politicians and diplomats, particularly in comparison with Pakistan, as a diplomacy wing. Aching VA naik, an Indian strategy expert, and late Praful Badawi stated that the Indian No First Use plan and promise form part of his continuous efforts towards establishing itself as a moderate and accountable power, following its disgraceful conduct in an open nuclear way. The commitment also covers India's progress and the creation of a nuclear warheads system. Again, they stated nuclear policy no first use is India's harmful plan to establish stability in India's nuclear policy. India's nuclearization policy and its preservation rely exclusively on India's structural and regional security conditions. A formal nuclear doctrine was not revealed until 4 January 2003. The NFU was stressed that only nuclear attacks in the Indian Territory or on Indian military elsewhere will be utilized as replacement.

## **Conclusion:**

It is obvious from the debate above that Indian nuclear policy has been established not considerably but step-by-step. This is the consequence of numerous ups and downs in India's nuclear policy growth. It originates from the backing of both domestic and foreign political players. However, the multi-faceted shift in power and position of India corresponds defines a number of minor changes in internal and external behaviors. Obviously, India's nuclear researchers and users to update played a very important part in putting India's Nuclear Programme, which is a moderate military strategy, into action and keeping it active. Indian countries also proclaim a certain degree of variation in restructuring and designing their nuclear policies in addition to their company participation. The No First Use regulation is not only one of India's costly contributions to the interpretation, but also seems universal, of an independent directory principle. India is technically very careful to crystallize from the external threat. Therefore, India's support system is presently extending from every region of the world to be definitely a far-reaching consequence. Since the goal is same, we agree that India will be inclusive in all parts of the

world. India is not maintaining its NSG relationship thus far, while this significant change from the geopolitical to global participation takes place. After the 1974 Pokhran Nuclear Test, the 2008 Nuclear accord between India and the United States ended the Indian nuclear isolation for 34 years.

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