

## **MILITARY ROLE OF THE OTTOMANS IN MUGHAL WARFARE IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 16<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY**

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### **Abstract**

Medieval period witnessed the birth of two empires that dominated battlefields during 16<sup>th</sup> century with the effective use of firearms. On the one hand, the Ottoman Empire lied Eastern Europe, Balkans, Anatolia, West Asia and North Africa; on the other hand, the Mughal Empire controlled Afghanistan and Indian subcontinent. Although these two empires were well-organised in terms of administrative structure, their military power played key role during their expansion since they were also successful in the applying of firearm technology in their armies along with their cavalry power. When the Ottomans learnt the firearms technology from Europeans, they improved it and became pioneer in its spread to other empires, like the Mughal Empire. This paper aims to explain the role of the Ottoman Turks both as commander, soldier and as gun masters in India and how they used firearms in the Mughal warfare during the first half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century.

### ***Keywords:***

The Ottoman Empire;  
the Mughal Empire;  
Gunpowder and Firearms;  
Rumi;  
India.

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## 1. Introduction

An interesting angle to look at wars is the way they bring two cultures together, a very different kind of acculturation. In this perspective, wars played a significant role in the transmission of military technology from one to others. On the other hand, when a nation developed a new weapon which changes the course of the battlefield, the other became very eager to develop stronger or to get the same weapon and eventually, the technology finds a way to reach other states. After the introduction of gunpowder and firearms into the battlefields with limited power at the beginning, they became major elements to empires in order to make real their military and politic goals. In time, without having cannon, artillery and handgun, these states were vulnerable against enemies since attack and defence were made with firearms. Therefore, it can be said that the firearms in early modern era had limitations, but they definitely fascinated people with their magic.

The Ottoman and the Mughal Empires emerged as two powerful Islamic empires whose rulers had same ethnic, linguistic and religious background even though some region-specific differences persisted. They benefited from the administrative and political background of Umayyads, Abbasids, Seljuks and Mongols. Besides, the Ottomans advantaged from the Roman Empire state culture as a reference. The remarkable similarities of the two empires can be seen in military arena as well. Although, mostly, the fighting capacity of Turkish cavalries through special horse breeds gave them advantage on the battlefield over their enemies, however, they came to dominate the battlefields through effective use of firearm technology.

Barring this similar administrative and military background, from the early stages of their imperium, Mughals and the Ottomans showed positive reaction to the increasing effectiveness of the firearms and gunpowder technology by producing, improving and distributing every kind of firearms. In his work on how gunpowder technology changed the course of battles in the modern era politics across the Europe and Asia, Kenneth Chase highlights some similarities between the Ottoman Empire and the Mughal Empire. Both empires that ruled immense population relied on infantry armed with muskets and cannons. Besides, he states that Ottomans and Mughals shared same weapons, tactics and even same military personals (Chase, 2003: 122, 133).

An interesting fact about these two empires remains that they were referred as “gunpowder empires” by the historians. The hypothesis was firstly used by Russian historian V. V. Barthold (Streusand, 1989: 11). Afterwards Marshall Hodgson furthered this in his book’s *Venture of Islam* (Vol. III) wherein he labelled the Ottomans, Mughals and Safavids as “gunpowder empires”. Hodgson asserts that the use of firearms created major political changes in the Islamic world from the middle of 15th century. A well-organised central power which could afford firearms possessed an edge over the local garrisons and local powers. Thus, firearms had a role in the creation and sustenance of the political structure of these Islamic empires – the Ottomans, Mughals and Safavids during 16th century (Hodgson, 1977).

Apart from Hodgson does hypothesis, William H. McNeill also points out that the centralised regimes got their power due to the use of firearms, especially artillery. He supports the gunpowder empire hypothesis by adding Japanese and Muscovites into this frame. However, McNeill argues that due to unfavourable conditions in the transportation of cannons and mortars to interior regions of the empire, the “imperial consolidation” of the Mughals “remained precarious” (McNeill, 1982a: 95-98) (McNeill, 1989b). Iqtidar Alam Khan (2004a) argues that firearms, especially cannons, helped the Mughals in establishing their hegemony in the Northern India plains in the beginning from where they expanded their borders to the most of Indian subcontinent. The gunpowder and firearms were also significant factors in the creation of centralised bureaucracy. In *Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom a Challenge to a Mediaeval Society* David Ayalon (1956) stresses that the traditional cavalry army of Mamluks was defeated by the Ottoman army which possessed advanced armoury in gunpowder and firearms in two battles respectively.

Due to its geographical proximity with Europe, the Ottomans were able to use firearm technology and they became part of the diffusion of military technology. Although European experts and historians claimed that the Ottoman Empire needed and depended on European know-how, Istanbul, the capital city of the Ottoman Empire, was the main military technological location where Turkish, Greek, Persian, Armenian, Bosnian, Serbian, Hungarian, Italian, and German artisans, blacksmith, miners and sappers worked together. Thanks to this dialogue, the Ottomans became the centre of transmission of gunpowder and firearms technology to the West

Asia and South India. The experts of the Ottoman Empire were sent to Turkistan, Crimean Khanates, Sultanate of Ache in Sumatra and Babur's Mughal India. These experts had a substantial role in the diffusion of firearm technology and the Rumi methods of warfare in the Mughal Empire (Agoston, 2005:194).

The raids and campaigns of the Ottomans into Europe through Balkans helped them to learn European military technology. When the Ottomans had acquired the production of the firearms, they had a direct role in the diffusion of them in Asia and Africa by sending its navies, commanders, artisans. Those people not only taught them the production and use of firearms, but also organised and became commanders of Indian armies.

Apart from political reasons, it should be answered the question why did Ottoman Turks prefer to go to India for military purposes? As it known, in the Ottoman Empire, only, Janissaries who were Christian boys converted to Islam and became household troops of the sultan were paid salary from the central treasure. On the other hand, Ottoman citizens could not be janissary, since it was restricted by law. Thus, it was likely that many young Ottoman Turks came to India to become a soldier who got regular payment. They were also preferred by Indian rulers since the Ottomans had knowledge of firearm technology and fighting capacity. This mutual benefit created an Ottoman influence. They served not only as, cannoners, and matchlockmen, but also became the commander of artillery in south Indian armies especially. It can be also said that they introduced firearm technology in South India, before Mughals arrived to north Indian territories. With the establishment of the Mughal dominion in the subcontinent, the effect of Turks and firearms became prominent. This paper will examine the role of Ottoman Turks, known also as Rumi, in the battles of the Mughals in the first half of 16th century.

## **2. Military Interaction between South Indian Rulers and the Ottomans Before the Mughals**

When the Portuguese expanded their sovereignty through Indian Ocean, the Muslim rulers of the region were not able to fight against Portuguese and their superior navy, which was enhanced with cannons. Mamluks in Egypt, Sheriff of Mecca, Ethiopian Muslim leader Sultan Ahmet Gran, Sultan of Gujarat, and Sultan of Atche appealed the Ottoman Empire for military aid. The

Ottoman government could not be unconcerned with their request due to political, economic and religious reasons (A.{DVNSMHM.d.../7 – 721)<sup>1</sup>. Considering themselves as the caliph of Islamic world, Ottomans thought the assistance as a kind of religious duty. Besides this, in political perspective, helping others gave them prestige among other Muslim monarchs, which made Ottomans champion of Muslims. Apart from religious and politic reasons, the change of sea routes hit the Ottoman economy very badly since the Ottomans controlled sea trade routes. Removing Portuguese from Indian Ocean became essential matter for the Ottomans in order to sustain their power.

First of all, Mamluk Sultan Kansu al Ghawri sought the Ottomans' military assistance in the beginning of the 16th century. Upon his request, the Ottoman sultan sent Mehmet b. Abdallah and Selman Reis as the captain of the fleet at Suez respectively. While Selman Reis was in the region, Sheriff of Mecca requested him not to leave the region because of Portuguese' pressure and attacks on Mecca and Medina. He successfully defended the region with the help the fleet equipped with firearms (Inalcık, 1975: 202-203), (Guilmartin, 2002: 83). Following years, Sultan Ahmed Gran, the Muslim ruler of Abyssinia, who obtained 900 musketeers defeated the Christian ruler of Abyssinia supported by 400 armed Portuguese soldiers thanks to Ottomans' assistance (Inalcık, 1975: 203-204). Moreover, he was able to conquered Ethiopia with the help of 200 Turkish arquebusiers (Aregay, 1980: 103).

Apart from Muslim kingdoms in Africa, the effects of the Ottoman military technology could be found in Indian subcontinent at the same years. Many Ottoman soldiers, gunners, gunmakers, seamen were in India bearing the name of Rumi or Rumlu (Inalcık, 1975: 204). Those men who proved their loyalty and military skills to Indian rulers at the battlefields held fief or governed towns for many years. Several Ottoman Turks talented as gunners, artillerymen and musketeers were employed by Sultanate of Gujarat. After Ottoman Sultan Suleiman secured the strongholds on the Arabian sea, he despatched a fleet to Bahadur Shah of the Sultanate of Gujarat. The fleet was under the control of two admirals named Khaja Safar and Ahmed Mustafa Beg. Bahadur Shah awarded the titles Khudavand Khan and Rumi Khan (Maghrebi, 1975: 187-188). According to sources, there were more than 3000 Turks in Gujarat Army. One of those Rumis

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<sup>1</sup>According to the Ottoman archival document, Ottoman sultan ordered to investigate whether a canal is possible or not from Mediterranean to Red Sea through Suez.

was Rumi Khan who was in charge of Sultan Bahadur. He held the fiefs of Ranir, Surat, Mahim and Diu (Farooqi, 2009: 11)<sup>2</sup>. Rumi Khan brought an immense cannon from Egypt which was pulled by 300 men and innumerable oxen. It was manufactured in 1530 (Butalia, 1998: 30). In following years, Rumi Khan took a good position in Gujarat army. When the Gujarat army came to fight with the Mughals, he advised Sultan Bahadur that

*In a pitched battle guns and muskets do not come into action. We have collected much artillery (...) it is advisable that a trench should be excavated round the army, and battles should be fought every day. When the Mughal troops would come in front of us, they would most of them be killed by discharges from the guns and muskets* (Khwajah Nizamuddin Ahmad, 1996: 50).

In war meeting, although Sadr Khan, the commander of cavalry, offered an immediate attack, Sultan Bahadur took his advice by trusting him. However, Rumi Khan deserted to Bahadur Shah and joined Humayun. When Bahadur Shah realised he was losing the war, he ordered to destroy his ordnances (Chambe, 1975: 246-247). On the other hand, two Ottomans Safar Khudawand Khan and his son Rajab Khudawand Khan were prominent commanders in Gujarat army. Safar Khudawand Khan was appointed as governor of Surat for many years and he built the fort of Surat by Turkish fashion (Farooqi, 2009: 11).

Apart from the Sultanate of Gujarat, the Bahmani Kingdom of Deccan (South India) also established close relations with Ottoman Turks. For instance, after the 'Battle of Adoni' between Bahmani Sultan Muhammed Shah Bahmani and Raja of Vijayanagar in 1368, Bahmani Sultan captured 300 gun-carriages as war booty. He also collected a train of artillery and put them under the command of Mukarrab Khan who attached Ottoman Turks and Europeans skilled in the art of gunnery (Butalia, 1998: 29).

Moreover, it is well known fact that the largest cannon of the world named Malik-i Maidan was cast in India by a Turk master. As Bhimsen stressed the Malik-i Maidan had no any rival as

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<sup>2</sup>Apart from those places, Bahadur Shah promised Rumi Khan to give Chitor, but he changed his mind after its conquest (Chambe, 1975: 245).

compared to size (Bhimsen, 1972: 157)<sup>3</sup>. When Mughal emperor Akbar conquered the fort of Surat, he saw some large immense cannons. Those pieces of ordnances were sent by Ottoman sultan Suleiman against Portuguese to Gujarat. Then, those pieces were left behind on the river bank. During the building of Surat, Khudawand Khan Wazir brought them into the fort. However, Akbar ordered them to transfer the fortress of Agra since he thought them useless in the fort of Surat (Al-Badaoni, 1884: 149-150). Except South Indian rulers, Sher Shah Suri also used Ottoman military technology and know-how by employing Hoca Ahmed Rumi, the Ottoman cannoner, founder and engineer. Hoca Ahmed Rumi cast bronze darbzan (cannon) in Ottoman style between 1541-1543 (Agoston, 2015: 166)<sup>4</sup>

### **3. The Military Interaction Between Mughals and Ottomans**

The Ottoman and Mughal relations can be traced to the rule of Babur Shah –the first Mughal ruler. The conflict between the Ottomans and Safavids turned the attention of Ottomans to the eastern borders of Safavids where Mughals and Uzbeks were dominant. The hostility of Uzbeks towards Safavid made them easily aligned with the Ottomans. However, the struggle between Uzbeks and the Mughals for domination in Central Asia prevented the possible association between the Ottomans and the Mughals. In this complex political situation, it was hard for Babur Shah to develop mutual relations with the Ottomans.

The destiny of Indian subcontinent and the Mughals changed with Uzbeks pressurizing Mughals in the Central Asian domain and with Rana Sangha, a local Indian ruler, and Daulat Khan Lodi, the governor of Lahore, inviting Babur Shah to fight against Ibrahim Lodi which was reigning in the northern Indian territories. Babur Shah with his well-organised military armed with firearms and approximately 12,000 strong cavalry arrived at Panipat, not far from Delhi, in April 1526. An important observation is how Babur Shah obtained these firearms. Concomitantly, Babur Shah was an ambitious but wise statesman who was aware of the major world affairs. The Ottoman victory over Safavids at the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514 and the conquest of the Egypt after two precise battles of Mercidabık and Ridaniyya over the Mamluks due to superior firearm

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<sup>3</sup>When Aurangzeb captured Malik-i Maidan, he ordered to engrave on it following words: “the emperor Alamgir Ghazi who is the king of monarchs who gave proper justice and seized the empires of the kings, captured Bijapur and in order to find out the date of conquest, his fortune said, ‘he captured the cannon entitled Malik-i Maidan’.”

<sup>4</sup>Those darbzan looked like the Ottoman style which cast in 1560s. It was easy to carry and cast them. They threw 150 gram balls. Their length approximately 1.32-1.54, weight 54-56 kg.

technology of the Ottomans took the attention of Babur. Consequently, he employed the firearm technology in his army through two skilled army commanders of Ustad Ali Quli and Mustafa Rumi who came from Ottomans. It was not known when they entered into Babur's service, but in Baburnama, Babur mentioned that Ustad Ali Quli was in Bajaur in 1519 (Zahiru'din Muhammad Babur (hereafter Baburnama), 2014: 368). The reason behind this uncertainty is that the records that gave information between 1520 and 1525 were lost, making it hard to find information about the preparations for the conquests. Even though it is well documented that the Ottoman sultans sent their technicians, engineers and commanders to assist the rulers of Central Asia and Africa etc., however, it is hard to claim that Ustad Ali Quli and Mustafa Rumi were provided by Ottomans to Babur Shah. Attempts towards strength the Mughal army could harm the Ottoman and Uzbek alliance. Therefore, it can be argued that Ustad Ali Quli and Mustafa Rumi could have joined Babur's services by their choice.

The First Battle of Panipat opened the gates of India for the Mughals. Babur Shah not only proved himself as a good commander, but also transformed the very nature of warfare in India by his effective use of firearms. Babur Shah's strategy in this battle was to avoid a fighting in open ground since his army was too small in comparison of Lodi's army which comprised of more than 100,000 soldiers and 1,000 war elephants (Baburnama, 2014: 470). Babur employed the battle tactics of Ottoman Sultan Selim I that the latter used against Safavid ruler Shah Ismail in the Battle of Chaldiran of 1514. The Ottoman battle tactic of 'chaining carts' together and positioning matchlock men and artillery behind these carts in the battle of Panipat was one of the main indirect evidence for interaction between Ottoman and Mughals (Baburnama, 2014: 468-469). After the protection of two flanks, Babur focused on how to guard the front of his army. He ordered every soldier to collect carts (araba) that were able to find about 700 carts. Ustad Ali Quli was commanded to arrange the carts according to Rumi fashion. These 700 carts were joined together by using ropes of raw hide instead of chains. Each wagon turned into a miniature fortress. Besides, five or six mantles were also fixed between every two carts where the matchlockmen (infantry) were to stand and fire (Baburnama, 2014: 468-469). Lastly, a number of gaps were left between carts to allow 100-200 horsemen to attack when needed. Sheltering his matchlockmen by such wagons was essential as the reloading time of the matchlocks was long. Not to forget, when Babur applied this tactic on the battlefield, he trusted his chief commanders



Mustafa Rumi Khan and Ustad Ali Quli. The good combination of cavalry and firearms with the help of two Ottoman Turks brought a certain victory for Babur Shah. This success at Panipat meant the establishment of Mughal dynasty in India. The importance of the First Battle of Panipat for Indian military history is that the role of gunpowder weaponry was extremely decisive here. Thus, it can be said that the Ottoman military tactic and Ottoman originated commanders changed the destiny of Babur Shah as well as India.

After the victory at Panipat, Babur Shah decided to stay in India and maintain his march over Rajputs. In this direction, he had to capture Biana Fort, he ordered to cast a large mortar to Ustad Ali Quli. In his memory Baburnama he described the process by following words:

*round the mortar-mould he had had eight furnaces made in which were the molten materials. From below each furnace a channel went direct to the mould. When he opened the furnace-holes on our arrival, the molten metal poured like water through all these channels into the mould. After awhile and before the mould was full, the flow stopped from one furnace after another. Ustad Ali Quli must have made some miscalculation either as to the furnaces or the materials.* (Baburnama, 2014: 536).

It seems that Ustad Ali Quli could not be successful in his first try, but Babur supported him by giving an honour to continue his work. This shows how important were the firearms for him and to sustain his achievement. Babur took note of the training of cannons and matchlocks by following eagerly.

The second prominent battle of Babur Shah was against Rajputs at Khanwa in 1527. Babur Shah again put his two commanders in the centre of the army and decided to use the same tactic against Rana Sangram Singh. Mustafa Rumi won the confidence of Babur with his military skills, so Babur appointed him to the right, where Humayun was situated. Mustafa Rumi was ordered to make those carts in the Rumi style and positioned artillery and musketeers behind them efficiently (Rushbrook, 1900: 146) (Baburnama, 2014: 550). The gunpowder master Ustad Ali Quli used a different method. Where the carts did not reach, the Khurasani and Hindustani spadesmen and miners dug ditches in front the army for double protection. The most remarkable

feature of his preparation was wheeled wooden tripods (Lane-Poole, 2015: 177). These tripods that could be trundled in every direction provided the soldiers both protection as well as accurate shot opportunity. All these arrangements were completed fully in twenty to twenty-five days, during which time the army was secured within the trenches (Erkinsen, 1845: 466).

When Rajput army began its march towards Mughals, they were encountered with well-protected line with firearms. The mortar which was cast by Ustad Ali Quli six months ago crushed Rajput line by throwing huge stones and the deadly shots of matchlockmen behind carts and tripods caused Rajputs to change their direction through the flanks (Sarkar, 1960: 61). The left wing of Rajputs was retreated by the right wing of Mughals with the use of gunfire which Rajputs were not prepared to deal with. Mustafa Rumi brought the carts forward and defeated most of the Rajputs with the fire of matchlock and strength his trusted men waiting at the rear for tulghma tactic (Baburnama, 2014: 568-569). In this final advance, Ustad Ali Quli played a key role, which Babur described in his words:

*such stones Ustad Ali Quli discharged at the iron-clad fortress of the pagan ranks and by this discharge of stones, and abundance of culverins and matchlocks destroyed many of the builded bodies of the pagans* (Baburnama, 2014: 570-571).

The use of firearm weapons at the battle of Khanwa brought a precise victory over Rajputs. Many Rajput commanders and chiefs of tribes were killed by matchlock shots. Rajput army could not resist against this military technology of the Mughals and lost battle despite its huge number. Babur consolidated his presence in India with this battle and most of north India became part of his domain. However, his early death stopped the consolidation process of the Mughals in north India. It is interesting that at the same years, the Ottoman Empire proved its superiority to European powers by using firearms with effective combination of cavalry at the battle of Mohacs in 1526.

The role of Ottoman Turks did not stay restricted with Ustad Ali Quli and Mustafa Rumi. After their death, the sons of Ustad Ali Quli remained in the service of Humayun, who ascended the Mughal throne after Babur's death. As it learnt from Tarikh-i Rashidi, at the Battle of Kanauj in

1540, the command of the guns was given to Muhammad Khan Rumi, to the sons of Ustad Ali Quli, to Ustad Ahmad Rumi and Husain Khalifa (Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, 1895: 475). In the following years, we can see another Ottoman Turk in the service of the Mughal army, who deserted Gujarat Sultan Bahadur Shah and joined Humayun during the siege of Mandu. Rumi Khan who became Mir Atish of Humayun's army played key role at the siege of Chunar in 1538 (Nath, 2011: 133). After the sudden death of Babur Shah, his son Humayun faced many challenges created by Afghans. After his Gujarat expedition, he arrived to Agra and was informed that Sher Shah attacked the Mughal territories and forts in the east. Upon these news, Humayun wanted to take the fort of Chunar from them and he consulted Rumi Khan about the taking of fort. In his reply Rumi Khan stated that "if it pleased God we shall take it by force" (Jouher, 1832: 5, 9). It can be seen that, Rumi Khan gained the confidence of Humayun in a short time and became one of the closest person to him. According to Tabaqat-i Akbari, Humayun gave him full power, and ordered whatever he needed to capture the Fort of Chunar (Khwajah Nizamuddin Ahmad, 1996: 62-64).

During siege, the first job of Rumi Khan was to get some information about the weak and strong sides of the fort. For this duty he selected his slave Kelafat. He told Kelafat to behave as a deserter to the Afghans to get inside the fort, and gaining some knowledge about it. The plan of Rumi Khan worked well and Kelafat returned the Mughal camp with sufficient knowledge. He advised Rumi Khan to attack the bastion on river side, to run a sap on the land side, and to cut all communication and possible supply lines of the fort by surrounding it. Rumi Khan brought his great guns to bear on the bastion near river, and appointed different batteries round the fort to various officers. When he realised the inefficiency of his guns on the walls from river side, he decided to construct scaffolds, which took some months, and erected them on the boats. After a long struggle he was able to capture the fort with the help of Rumi Khan's artillery and he awarded Rumi Khan with various favours. When the fort was captured by the Mughals, Rumi Khan ordered to be cut off hands of 3000 artillerymen cruelly, which made Humayun angry. However, Humayun took his advice about who could be commander of the fort. Rumi Khan suggested Beg Myrak and in this direction he was appointed. The advice of Rumi Khan provoked other chiefs and he was poisoned by them (Jouher, 1832: 10-11).

Another Ottoman citizen who left a mark in India was Sidi Ali Reis. After he lost his navy in Indian Ocean, he landed in Gujarat with his men. As it is followed from his memoirs, he left some cannons to Melik Asad, amir of Gujarat Sultan, in Daman, so he tried to return Istanbul by land route from Indian subcontinent. Besides, he helped Gujarat Sultan Ahmet with his 200 tufeng-endaz (riflemen) (Seydi Ali Reis, 1975: 48-50). During his presence in India and Central Asia, he faced many difficulties, but he overcame those difficulties created by local rulers, governors and bandits with his less than 150 tufeng-endaz. When he met with Mughal ruler Humayun, his military background and abilities took the attention of Humayun; hence, he was offered to stay in India by giving jagir, but he rejected this offer kindly (Inalcık, 1975: 205) (Seydi Ali Reis, 1975: 48-50).

One of the important skill and branch which was introduced by the Ottomans to the Mughal Empire was the mounted musketeers called barqandaz, a corps of mounted musketeers established in the reign of Jahangir. The skill of firing a musket from horseback was learnt by the Ottomans from their European rivals and most probably they were brought the flintlock musket, which were suitable to fire on horseback, to India (Khan, 2006b: 62). However, this new format was maintained only by small unit of Rumi musketeers, which it shows it was a limited military branch. They were able to fire when they dismounted, but although it seems disadvantage during the battle, they were useful branch of the army against rebels' hit and run tactic. Thus, they proved their effectiveness (Khan, 2004: 153-155).

In the 17th century, the circumstance began to change with the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb. He realised that the firearm technology of the Ottoman Empire did not answer the new technological developments compared to Europeans that had better quality of weapons and well-disciplined armies (Qureshi, 2010: 254). Thus, he began to employ European engineers in the Mughal army. However, although this reduced the effect of Turks in the Mughal army, with the expansion of Mughal dominion through south India the number of Turks in the army raised due to the fact that many Ottomans Turks were in South Indian armies. According to observation of Mehmed Emin Efendi, who was in the mission of Sultan Mahmud I to Muhammed Shah in 1744, many Ottomans were employed and they were favourites in the Mughal army (Miroğlu, 1984: 552).

The Ottomans not only send military aid, but also played a role in terms of transferring artisans, artillerymen and gunners who were expert in firearm technology to India. Ottoman citizens such as Selman Reis, Sidi Ali Reis, Rumi Khan, Ustad Ali Quli and Mustafa Rumi left a mark in those countries in terms of military technology and knowledge. It is so obvious that this occurrence gave the Ottomans prestige among Muslim states. Besides, the Turkish military terms like Rumi, Destur-i Rumi, Rumlu, Top, Araba which the Ottomans used were also spread to many different geographies.

#### **4. Conclusion**

Throughout the history, there were many inventions that changed the destinies of human beings, empires and regions. The gunpowder was among those. It was invented in China, developed in Europe and used successfully in the Ottoman and Mughal empires during their battles. When the Ottomans achieved the production of firearms in good quality, it took Indian rulers' attention. With the geographical proximity between West Asia and India, the transmission of military technology became more quick. In order to eliminate the Portuguese dominion in Indian Ocean, Indian rulers applied to the Ottomans for help. It is obvious that before the Mughal Empire was established by Babur Shah, the Ottoman Empire had built firm relations with Indian dynasties mainly based on military aspects.

On the other hand, the biggest effect of the Ottoman military technology was on the Mughal Empire. The army of Babur was typical central Asian nomad and was consisted of good cavalry branch. Thus, it was easy to adopt the gunpowder weaponry into its army since Ustad Ali Quli and Mustafa Rumi knew how to do it. Therefore, many historians have accepted that he was the first person who used them in a battlefield effectively as war-winning subjects. The combination of cavalry warfare, wagon laager tactic and firearms was achieved by his Turkish gunners to his army successfully. Since these people learnt this tactic from the Ottomans, they integrated easily to Babur's army. The reason is that Babur's army was ready to accept this because he was using cavalry warfare in central Asia.

Lastly, it can be said that the Ottoman military technology arrived Indian shores because of Portuguese threat and took place with the special interest of Indian rulers. Among those rulers,

Babur Shah was able to dominate north Indian battlefields with the two Ottoman firearm specialists, Ustad Ali Quli and Mustafa Rumi. Following the Ottoman war method, strategy and weapon technology, Mughals controlled the almost all Indian subcontinent.

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