

## **PAKISTAN: A CONCERN FOR INDIA'S SECURITY**

**Ajay Singh**

Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Research Scholar, Maharshi Dayanand University Rohtak

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ajaysingh.rs.defence@mdurohtak.ac.in

### **Abstract:**

Between 1984 and 1997, Pakistan and India attempted to resolve a number of issues, including the conflicts over Siachen, Sir Stream, and Tulbul or Wular, to no avail. Because of decades of animosity between the two countries, delegates met, discussed, and created contracts, but management's ultimate permission was still required. There was no willingness on the part of either India or Pakistan to move away from their earlier stances and establish a middle ground or another viewpoint. At the same time, hundreds of people were being killed by weariness and terrorism, and negotiators were meeting on a regular basis, but little progress was made at that time. Pakistan and Kashmir have received worldwide attention because of an obvious nuclear weapons display in this region, which has garnered attention from the international community. A big battle in the area is less likely now, according to Pakistani and Indian officials, because the two countries have nuclear deterrent in place. Technical faults and misunderstandings can lead to unintended nuclear warfare, therefore there is a risk of misinterpretation.

**Keywords: country, conflict, partition, security, relations.**

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

India and Pakistan have faced several difficulties since 1947, but the most devastating has been their strained relationship. Even while 1947's segregation of the subcontinent seemed to be a futile attempt to alleviate some of its minorities' most vexing issues, it only served to redefine the setting in which communal forces may operate. But even if India and Pakistan's early interactions were marked by violence and hostility, the root cause of their apparent irrational behaviour is not to be found in the surface form of their disagreements.

During the process of Pakistan's construction and birth, the roots of this behaviour were developed.

Indians and Pakistanis share a lot of cultural traits, such as colonial domination and the iron framework of their administrative systems. India and Pakistan were under an unified central administration just six decades ago, with one administrative language and one shared culture. These two nations are also significant players in the SAARC alliance. Bringing peace and security to the region is possible if the two countries can work together. The ideological framework of Pakistan based on the two-nation theory, which India has never embraced, stands in the way of these two countries working together. Another issue is the Kashmir conflict, which is closely related to the aforementioned notion. There are so many shared elements between these nations that once Kashmir is resolved, they may truly eliminate the obstacles and roadblocks that now keep them apart. Both South Asian neighbours' disputes and wars have shown that nothing major could be achieved by hostility and have progressively moved toward conciliation. The need to critically assess India-Pakistan disputes and debates grows as a result of this. In order to foster mutual respect and collaboration, both countries must have a thorough grasp of the topics and difficulties that divide them. In this backdrop, the current study was conducted in order to investigate and discover the areas of disagreement and argument between India and Pakistan.

## **2. DETERMINANTS OF INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS**

During a conference at the Chamber of Commerce in Bombay after Pakistan's freedom, Quaid-e-Azam declared, "We will live in Pakistan and you will live in India." As a result, we'll get to know our neighbours. As two brothers in trade and business, we seek to coexist in harmony. Four wars have been fought between Indians and Pakistanis ever since India and Pakistan were born as a result of brutal partition in 1947. As a result of India's hegemonic design, the country's ties with its smaller neighbours in South Asia are rarely cordial. Between 1984 and 1997, Pakistan and India attempted to resolve a number of issues, including the conflicts over Siachen, sir stream, and Tulbul or Wular, to no avail. Because of decades of animosity between the two countries, delegates met, discussed, and created contracts, but management's ultimate permission was still required. There was no willingness on the part of either India or Pakistan to move away from their earlier stances and establish a middle ground or another viewpoint. At the same time, hundreds of people

were being killed by weariness and terrorism, and negotiators were meeting on a regular basis, but little progress was made at that time. The Kashmir conflict and the incomplete partition plan exacerbated their distrust and enmity toward one other. Since its founding in 1948, Pakistan has been involved in three major wars: the First World War (1948), the Second World War (1965), and the Third World War (1971). Since the beginning of the subcontinent's division, Pakistan and India have had to deal with several security threats as a result of the country's historically antagonistic relationship with India. India's historic military might was a serious danger to Pakistan, but following a nuclear explosion in 1998, the environment between the two countries shifted. India's administration and head of state exhibited usual pragmatism in the fight against long-standing unrest in Kashmir following the May 1998 nuclear tests. India viewed this force as superior than Pakistan's. With this threat, Pakistan conducted its own nuclear test and decided to reject all international pressure. Leaders were able to deal with national limits imposed by nuclear explosions thanks to widespread support for their policies at the national level. Pakistan-India relations have taken on a new dimension as nuclear and conventional dangers coexist. It was only when the 1999 Kargil conflict was finally resolved that the nuclear testing in the region restored some sense of balance (Johnson, 2005). Pakistan and Kashmir have received worldwide attention because of an obvious nuclear weapons display in this region, which has garnered attention from the international community. A big battle in the area is less likely now, according to Pakistani and Indian officials, because the two countries have nuclear deterrent in place. Nuclear conflicts can be caused by misunderstandings as much as by technological faults. The need of timely access to real-time nuclear weapons information has increased. Both states' populations and societies will be seriously affected and challenged by this shortfall. The autocratic dictators or colonial overlords that left a weak, backward, and conventional economic framework in place across South Asia. There was no economic infrastructure in any of the countries save for Sri Lanka and India where some growth had occurred during colonial control. Modernization and development in South Asia started in earnest in the 1950s. The South Asian economy have been impacted by a number of issues and challenges. There are profound ties between the two South Asian neighbours on all these fronts, but the distinctive pattern of positive and passive confrontations between them successfully alienates and divides both of them (Upreti, B.C). New and unforeseen challenges occurred after 1947, adding to the underlying atmosphere of distrust, antagonism, and mistrust between Pakistan and India. It was one of the most prominent stories in the other country,

and the divide between the two stretched even further in 1947. However, there are other things that bring people closer together or at the very least keep the disagreement from getting worse. The contemporary rivalry is motivated by a desire to avoid a direct confrontation in the presence of nuclear weapons, as well as a recognition of shared cultural connections and economic interdependence. It's a paradoxical relationship: the quest for resolutions to past disputes accompanies new ones, which may or may not be directly related at times.

- A. **Problems Emerging from the Partition:**The religious minority was the first and most pressing issue. Rahmat Ali, Iqbal, and Jinnah's two-nation thesis led to India's division, which resulted in the migration of a vast number of people. A big number of Hindus were unable to leave Pakistan, whereas a large number of Muslims remained in India and became permanent residents. There have been a number of significant communal riots in India and Pakistan since the split, which has resulted in tension on the Indian subcontinent.
- B. **Problems Arising After the Partition of India:**Additionally, Hindu-Muslim antagonism, ideological divisions, and a diverse socioeconomic structure all contributed to the deteriorating of Indo-Pak ties.
- C. **External Factors affecting Indo-Pakistan Relations:**As a result of many external influences, the Indo-Pak ties since 1947 have been shaped. When India and Pakistan were involved in an international event in some way, the two nations' ties were affected.

### 3. SECURITY CONCEPT BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

There are several ramifications of the security notion. As a result, it has to be put into perspective. Barry Bazan argues that moral, ideological, and regulatory factors separate people's conceptions of security. As a result, the theoretical basis for determining safety are constantly different. In the actual world, security can only be regarded as a result of or a synonym for power.

Normative and social constructivist, this human-centered approach may be traced back to the heart of this method. a more complete view of security, such as human security," would allow people interact with local and global levels as a transformation that displays the

power of ideas to model; this would be the optimal approach. For example, Kim (2010a). For the purpose of identifying particular concerns, an interpretation of causation and / or recommendations for the article discussed and/or the content of the message to be further highlighted. The study's theoretical framework will be based on Barry Buzan's Regional Security Complex Theory and the Realist approach. In today's globe, security has arisen as a major concern, yet its implementation in South Asia is lagging behind. As opposed to ideas such as authority, justice, peace, equality, and freedom, security is a tough concept to grasp.

### **A. Kashmir Issue**

There are a variety of perspectives on Kashmir because of ideological and financial differences." Indian-Pakistan relations have been entangled in a complicated dispute over the right to self-determination" (Rizvi, 1994). For many years, the Kashmir dispute has been a thorn in the side of the Indian government. In accordance with a UN resolution, Pakistan and India signed a ceasefire agreement on January 1, 1949. That has never happened in India. Kashmir is a thorny topic because of the differing viewpoints and expectations of the two countries involved. Unresolved conflicts in the South Asian area have posed a danger to security (Korbel, 1966). Kashmir has been the driving force behind a number of conflicts between India and Pakistan. According to the partition plan, Kashmir is part of Pakistan at this moment. India, on the other hand, is determined to go ahead regardless of the consequences. In India, the Kashmir problem is a matter of life and death. He was certain that Kashmir will annex Pakistan because of the huge proportion of Muslims living there. It was the idea of two countries that motivated Muslims from the subcontinent to seek a separate homeland where they might practise their religion without fear of persecution. They opposed the notion of two countries and said that Indian National Congress was India's sole representative political organisation. It is the belief of the Muslims of Pakistan and Kashmir that the distribution is incomplete without the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan, which was the major reason for its partition. In the Kashmir dispute, these two nations have previously engaged in three major wars, all of which have ended in defeat. As a result, the conflict in Kashmir should not serve as a pretext for a war between the two countries, as Kashmiri people have a right to self-determination under UN resolutions. For 584 Princely States, the privilege was granted, but Kashmiri people are still denied in this modern period.

## **B. Kashmir conflict and Four-Point Formula of Musharraf**

Since 1947, the Jammu and Kashmir disputed territory has been a major source of tension between Pakistan and India. As a result, the two have failed to reach agreement on this unfinished agenda for seven decades and have instead opted for a zero-sum approach to the matter. Even their perspectives on the subject and the tales they present to support them diverge. After the 1989-90 revolt and India's attempt to deal with Kashmiris through coercive methods, Pakistan stepped up its efforts to internationalise the problem. Gen. Musharraf was also said to have pushed the Kashmir issue further from Pakistan's accepted position than any of his predecessors. Atal Behari Vajpayee, the Indian prime minister at the time, met with him in 2001 in an effort to break an impasse in ties between the two countries. According to Musharraf, "We support the United Nations Security Council decisions. To put it another way: if we want to address this issue, all parties must communicate with a degree of flexibility, moving beyond their stated stances, and finding a middle ground somewhere in between. We're ready to take on anything comes our way. "India must be able to adapt as well" (Shah & Riaz, 2013). During an interview with Indian television network NDTV on December 5, 2006, President Musharraf offered a solution to the Kashmir dispute by offering a "Four-Point Formula."

## **C. Kargil Conflict**

Kargil is not considered a war, yet it is one of the most significant clashes between Pakistan and India. There was an Indian reinforcing line in the Kashmir Valley, which makes the location crucial in the context of the Kashmir dispute. During the battle, the dangers of nuclear weapons were brought into sharp focus. The atomic bomb was tested by both countries shortly prior to the battle. There was no nuclear war because of the world community's action in stopping the fight. Hussain (2006) cited in the article America's eye-opener occurred in 1999 when Pakistan and India were on the verge of nuclear war, and it was the United States' involvement that kept it from happening. Since then, the United States has been concerned about the volatile situation in South Asia. There have been a number of official and public-to-public meetings and conversations between the countries of Pakistan and India in recent months at the behest of the United States in order to address

disputed issues, particularly the Kashmir issue. To put it another way: The international community's assistance helped bring an end to the fighting. United States pressured Pakistan and India into resolving unsolved issues, such as Kashmir, at a negotiation table. More than 1,200 people were killed on both sides of the fighting.

#### **D. Water Issue**

In 1948, India shut off Pakistan's water supply, which worried the Pakistani people, who feared that Jammu and Kashmir may fall under Indian rule. Besides the start of violence in Kashmir, this is also shared by conflicts over water resources and the distribution of conflicts, various border concerns and charges of ethnic minority migrations. Conflicts over these issues are typically intense. Inconsistent and caustic terminology is frequently used in both the government and the media to discuss the relationship between India and Pakistan (Raghavan, 2013). Water is a critical component of the current timeline, which is why we're kicking things off with this subject. Future water wars are inevitable owing to the depletion of this precious resource and the accompanying rise in energy demand that comes with an ever-increasing global population. It's for this same reason that some countries are preserving their control over various water reservoirs to ensure that they have enough water for their future requirements. Indus basin water allocation is an ongoing battle between India and Pakistan, which are both upper and lower riparian states. For the sake of Pakistan's economy, India is building dams on Pakistan's due water share, which is causing serious challenges, including a power deficit. For Pakistan's energy demands, it is imperative that the country's political tensions be eased and hydroelectric power projects be started up. Because peace between India and Pakistan means "tranquilly and peace in South Asia," the two countries should work together to find a solution to the issue of water.

#### **E. Terrorism**

"Every nation's principal aim is to safeguard and achieve adequate defence for its country," it is stated. The prospect of a terrorist attack makes no nation feel at ease. A state's capacity to protect its territory and institutions, as well as the people who claim to represent the state, is strained in the Third World countries (including Pakistan). Terrorism, suicide assaults, target killings, and assassination on the basis of political, sectarian, and ethnic lines, among other things, are common in the South Asian area. Pakistan has been the worst hit by the "War on Terrorism," which has emerged as the most important conflict of

the twenty-first century. As a result of Pakistan's involvement in the war on terror, the country has been subjected to "multidimensional" external security pressure. The war's greatest casualty has been Pakistan. As compared to the other parties in Afghanistan, Pakistan's situation has suffered a significant pounding (Goraya, 2014). Pakistan has been made a front-line state in order to play a game in which Pakistan is both a friend and an adversary to the United States. A battle has been waged in Pakistan since the September 11 attacks. With each passing day, it becomes increasingly impossible to determine who is on the other side (Javaid, 2013).

#### **4. INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS – THE SECURITY VECTOR**

The Security Council resolution, in India's view, has effectively wiped out Pakistan's claims to Kashmir, which Pakistan perceives as a betrayal of the international community and its institutions. As a result of Pakistan's failure to achieve a military edge over India in 1971, Pakistan's displeasure grew as India helped Bangladesh become an independent state and eliminated Pakistan's two-front menace. Dissatisfied with what they perceived as a lack of economic and political opportunity, the people of East Pakistan, the most of whom were ethnic Bengalis, took to the streets. West Pakistan's authorities dismissed the Awami League's 167-seat win in the March 1971 general election, which was a triumph for nationalist Bengali nationalists. Following a brutal repression of Bengali nationalism, Mujibur Rehman, the head of the Awami League, declared independence from West Pakistan on March 23, 1971.

West Pakistani forces were dispatched to East Pakistan by Pakistan's President, Mohammed Yahya, to reestablish West Pakistani control. It was decided that the only way to defeat Bengali nationalism was to use brutal force. Indira Gandhi began assisting the MuktiBahini, the Bangladeshi resistance, when she saw a chance to split Pakistan. Ten million refugees arrived in India as a result of the Army's crackdown at the time. Indian forces were sent into East Pakistan to defend the Bengalis from economic difficulties presented to India. As a matter of fact, she viewed the civil war as a way to splinter Pakistan. The Pakistani Army's top brass committed a huge mistake at this point. Pakistani forces claimed repeated triumphs over India while suffering huge losses and distributing information about these "victories" through the West Pakistani media. Pakistani Army officials realised they had lost not just the war with India but also the trust of West Pakistanis who had looked to the army as their country's protectors until they were forced



to openly concede in Bangladesh. In spite of this backing from the Pakistani people, the Pakistani Army would never again have the full and unwavering loyalty of the Pakistani people. Once again, India was shown as a dangerous country whose only objective was to re-integrate Pakistan.

A nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and its accompanying strike force were dispatched to the Bay of Bengal by US President Richard Nixon, who had an uneasy relationship with India's prime minister, Indira Gandhi. To deter India from sending troops into Pakistan, this was done. This is most likely due to Henry Kissinger, Nixon's National Security Advisor, initiating moves to utilise Yahya as an intermediary in Washington's Cold War against Moscow to create relationships with China. The Indian government heeded the warning and withdrew its soldiers from the border. It has also been a contributing factor in Pakistan's growing resentment toward the United States as the India-US relationship has become more and more entwined.

India-Pakistan ties have been strained by the Pakistani Army's belief that it is either above accountability to an elected government or that it should be in control of setting the country's foreign policy. Kargil, which nearly triggered all-out war between the two countries, serves as a good illustration of this. A year later, Pakistan's military chief Pervez Musharraf moved soldiers across the Line of Control into Indian-administered Kashmir, breaking the Simla Agreement, and seized crucial positions. Before Indian soldiers retook the locations from Pakistani forces, an unrecognised battle erupted. Pakistan was singled out by the Clinton Administration as the infringer in this case. He travelled to the United States in July to update President Clinton on Pakistan's views on the current situation. President Obama informed him that the Army was preparing its nuclear troops for deployment, which surprised him. When the Prime Minister was not informed of the Army's incursion into India or that its nuclear forces were being prepped for deployment, it was revealing.

There are several reasons for this antagonism between the nuclear-armed neighbours, including the Army's deployment of non-conventional troops. According to an earlier FDI piece:

Taliban commanders were in no doubt that they were being run by the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence organisation, which is a branch of the Pakistani military, according to

a research released by the London School of Economics in 2010. Recent occurrences have provided ample support for this assertion. Afghan security officials revealed in late July 2015 that the Taliban commander, Mullah Omar, had died in Karachi in April 2013. Ghani requested a meeting with the Taliban leadership in Pakistan after he became president of Afghanistan in 2014 in an effort to improve strained relations between the two countries. The Taliban representatives were said to have travelled from Pakistan to the summit in Murree. The Pakistani Prime Minister's advisor, Mr Sartaj Aziz, has previously confirmed that Pakistan exercised some influence over the Taliban, according to the same storey. He said, 'We have some impact on them since their leadership is in Pakistan, and they get certain medical services, their families are here. Because of this, we may utilise those levers in order to pressure [sic] them into saying, "Come to the table." The head of the Afghan Taliban, Mullah Mansour (also spelled Mansoor), was assassinated in a drone attack in Baluchistan, Pakistan, in May of [2016]. Consequently, Pakistan's Interior Minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, accused the United States of 'putting Pakistan in a tough situation'. Perhaps he wasn't only talking about Pakistan's diminishing influence over the Taliban, but rather a wider range of factors.

Every chance has been seized by India to stifle Pakistan. Indian spies have long been said to be working in Balochistan to bring about the province's separation from Pakistan. Pakistan accuses India of attempting to divide Pakistan into smaller states. Since New Delhi claims that Pakistani-based militants launched an attack on a military camp inside Indian-Administered Kashmir, Indian forces have launched a series of attacks on alleged terrorist training camps in Pakistan as a response. Pakistan has complained that this does not help build a good relationship with India.

Some of this is true, but it's not everything. Nawaz Sharif and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's relationship began on a high note of hope and good-will, though. Mr Modi welcomed Mr Sharif to his inauguration ceremony in New Delhi, the two leaders visited each other's countries, and Mr Modi made an unannounced visit to Pakistan to meet Mr Sharif on the occasion of the latter's grand-wedding daughter's while on his way back to India from Afghanistan. These trips and their budding relationships, however, were given short shrift by the acts of the Pakistani Army in almost every case. According to the Army's leadership, a rise in goodwill toward one of the other countries may mean a decline in their basic *raison d'être*. Because of this, Pakistan's political leaders must restore the

unique power to define, design, and conduct their foreign policy totally. When it comes to dealing with Pakistan's political leadership, India must recognise their problems and engage with them to bring about long-term democracy.

Because of recent events, the existing relationship has returned to its previous antagonistic attitude. It is possible that US\$10 billion in business links between the two nations might develop if the two leaders were able to put aside their political disagreements and work together to improve their personal and bilateral relations. There is a good chance that this will lead to a more normal relationship between them. For the elected government to regain total control of Pakistan's foreign policy, it must first eliminate the constant fear of a military coup from the equation. The Indian government, on the other hand, must recognise the limits Pakistan's government works under and find methods to assist it in its efforts.

Even though it will take much fortitude and perseverance on the part of both countries, India and Pakistan stand to gain greatly from making this shift. Despite how appealing this potential may sound, the existing internal politics of the two countries make it unlikely that it will come to fruition.

## 5. CONCLUSION

There is a similar thread running across all of the issues that plague Indo-Pakistan relations, such as Kashmir, nuclear security, and boundary demarcation: distrust and suspicion. As a result of Pakistan's asymmetrical geo-physical and military structure, the country is more sceptical. Its attitude toward India reflects this recurring problem of national security. For example, Pakistan considers its security concerns in relation to India in a regional context that excludes China, in the perspective of conventional forces. As a result, New Delhi's national security worries are focused on China, rather than Pakistan alone. As a result, Islamabad's recommendations do not take New Delhi's worries into account. While India's view has become more global, Pakistan's has remained mostly regional. In their approach to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, they show this duality.

When it comes to nuclear disarmament, Pakistan's stance is bound up with India's. Because of this apparent contradiction, India rejected its offers for a five-power meeting in June 1991 and April 1994. At one time, Pakistan's entry into the NPT and CTBT was always

related to India's posture. Rather than looking at India's defence needs in terms of the South Asian context, Pakistan should be more sensitive to India's security concerns. The delicate nature of Indo-Pakistan ties necessitates the establishment of a framework for conversation along the lines of the recent US-India/Pakistan dialogue. Additionally, this should be done in a manner that promotes openness and compromise between the parties involved. But before embarking on the planned path, the only practical option is to establish a mutually trusting atmosphere. The Kashmir problem, which has long been used for political gain by both countries, must also be minimised. The subject of Kashmir is not one that can be debated between the ideologies of two nations.

Diplomacy between the two nations is most imaginative and up-to-date when it comes to the use of buses. Within a few months, the effects of this diplomacy would be apparent. Agreements on all agreed-upon aspects of the MoU signed on February 22, 1999, although while generally praised, need to be worked out. Possibly because of internal political pressures. The MoU has been seen by Islamabad as a win in the Kashmiri problem by the Indian government. Pakistan's Foreign Office spokesman's comment following the Lahore announcement reinforces the idea that the Kashmir issue is more important to Islamabad than nuclear security issues. As in the past, one fears that agreement on the MoU's concerns may not be held hostage to the resolution of Kashmir in accordance with Islamabad's terms and conditions, as in the past. The goodwill produced by Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit may quickly dissipate if both countries fail to implement real measures to maintain it.

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