

## PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS OF 1937 IN BIHAR

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**Abstract**—*The context in which 1937 provincial elections were held in Bihar influenced the whole process of the elections. The support for Communal Award by the political parties claiming to represent interests of Muslims of Bihar and their criticism of those who were opposed to Communal Award influenced campaigning in the reserved constituencies. Similarly, the rejection of the Government of India Act 1935 by the Indian National Congress on the grounds that the Act neither helped the cause of Indian Independence nor the cause of amelioration of poverty and economic development, added a new dimension to the campaign. This paper deals with the agenda with which different political parties went to the electorates for their votes.*

**Key Words**—*Communal Award, Government of India Act 1935, Indian National Congress, All India Muslim League, The Bihar Muslim United Conference, the Bihar Muslim United Party, the Muslim Independent Party, the Radical Muslim Party and the Ahrar Party, election manifesto, etc.*

The 1937 elections for provincial legislatures, in general were unique in many ways and more so in Bihar. One of the general uniqueness was that no political party was happy with the 1935 Act yet all parties contested the elections. Some of these parties were opposed to the Communal Award which had been incorporated in the 1935 Act, some supported the Award but were opposed to the federal part of the Act and there was the Congress which was opposed to the Act and had rejected it in its entirety. The elections were unique also because even at the time of going to election the Congress had not arrived at any answer regarding acceptance of office in case it won the elections. The uniqueness of the elections is also reflected in new and unheard of parties springing up like mushrooms. The elections were also very significant because it was being held at a time when the national movement was increasingly becoming progressive in its attitude. Its views on socio-economic and political issues of importance had alarmed the colonial state, the conservative zamindari class and the communalists alike.

The Government of India Act 1935, not only contained the provisions of the Communal Award but also provided for federation of provinces and the Indian states but made it optional for the Indian states. This meant that they could choose to opt out of the federation, which option they did exercise and federation remained a distant dream. The Act did provide some autonomy to provincial legislatures but Governors were given extraordinary overriding powers.<sup>1</sup> In the field of legislation Previous sanction of the Governor as well as of the Governor General was required. In certain cases, even for introducing a Bill in the

provincial legislature previous sanction was required. Even if it was achieved, the Governor was empowered to stop the discussion on the Bill at any stage. Added to all this was the power of the Governor; to veto the Bill even after being passed by the legislature or, to reserve the Bill for the approval of the Governor - General. Moreover, the British Government was empowered to set aside any law that was passed by the provincial legislature.<sup>ii</sup> Even matters such as law and order were not transferred to the provincial legislature forcing Rajendra Prasad to call it a fraud to declare any such transfer because special responsibility with respect to law and order was reserved for the Governor - General and the Governor in wider and all-pervasive terms.<sup>iii</sup>

The Act of 1935 met with an absolute rejection by the parties concerned. The Indian National Congress at its Lucknow session in April 1936 rejected the act in its entirety. It declared that any constitution imposed by outside authority; undermined the sovereignty of Indian people, failed to recognise and uphold their political and economic rights, and was unacceptable. It was emphasised that the constitution must be framed on the basis of recognition of the independence of India by a Constituent Assembly.<sup>iv</sup>

The All India Muslim League expressed its acceptance of the Communal Award till a substitute was agreed upon between the communities concerned. It opposed the constitution embodied in the Government of India Act 1935 as fundamentally bad. The Muslim League argued that the constitutional provisions instead of bringing peace would lead to disaster if it were forcibly imposed because it was entirely unworkable in the interest of India and her people.<sup>v</sup>

The Bihar Muslim United Conference expressed that it wanted to work the new Constitution in the interest of the Muslim community. It was prepared to cooperate with those of the majority community who were prepared to work it in spite of its shortcoming.<sup>vi</sup>

The Bihar Socialist Conference also denounced the new Constitution and described it as a tool invented by the British to hold the country all the more firmly in the shackles of slavery and to suppress the surging tide of freedom. The Conference passed a resolution declaring that a general strike should be observed on 1 April, 1937 - the day when the constitution was to become operative throughout the country - to express "resentment and condemnation" of the same. The resolution further appealed to the; about to be held; Ferozpur session of the Congress to adopt this programme.<sup>vii</sup>

Despite the rejection of the Constitution by the Congress and despite the rejection of the federal part of the Constitution by the Muslim League, both the parties, for reasons of

their own, participated and contested the election held in 1937 under the provisions of the very same Constitution. The Congress decided to contest the election to defeat British imperial designs of further consolidating its position in the country by securing more intimate cooperation of the stakeholders. In its election manifesto adopted on 22 August 1936 it emphatically stated that it was fighting the elections for two reasons. For one, it wanted to prevent collaborators from helping British imperialism in its pursuit of greater domination and exploitation of India and secondly to combat the Act in the provincial legislatures.<sup>viii</sup>

The Muslim League too decided to contest the elections. It was of the opinion that the existing situation called for utilising the provincial scheme of the Constitution for what it was worth.<sup>ix</sup> In its manifesto it said that its representatives would work to replace the Provincial Constitution as well as the proposed Central Constitution by democratic self-government. It also maintained that the League would try to extract the maximum benefit out of the constitution for the uplift of the people in various spheres of national life.<sup>x</sup>

Besides these two national parties, a few regional parties were formed soon after the announcement of the new Constitution with a view to contest the elections. Four parties namely, the Bihar Muslim United Party, the Muslim Independent Party, the Radical Muslim Party and the Ahrar Party<sup>xi</sup> were formed and the founders claimed that their respective parties would look after the specific interests related to the Muslim community in Bihar. All of them were unanimous regarding contesting the election so that they might be able to work the Constitution in favour of their community. They all believed that the new Constitution was workable and that they could achieve their desired goal despite the limitations of the constitutional provisions. In a significant development the *zamindars* of Bihar formed the Bihar United Party.<sup>xii</sup> The United Party also believed in cooperating with the Constitution and sought to serve the interests of the landholders of Bihar through its representatives in the legislature.

The election manifesto of the Indian National Congress maintained that neither independence nor eradication of poverty and unemployment could be achieved through the scheme of the 1935 Act.<sup>xiii</sup> The manifesto reiterated the Fundamental Right resolution of the 1931 Karachi session. It recognised the necessity of further consideration of the problems of poverty and unemployment and other economic problems like land reforms, rent reduction and remission wherever necessary.<sup>xiv</sup> To address indebtedness the manifesto advocated the state to play a crucial role. It called for the declaration of a moratorium and an enquiry into the whole question of indebtedness. The objective was scaling down of debts as well as establishing state - sponsored credit facilities providing cheap credit to tenants, small

landholders, peasant proprietors and even petty traders.<sup>xv</sup> The Congress manifesto argued for a decent standard of living, working hours and conditions. It recognised the rights of the industrial workers to form unions and resort to strike for the protection of their interests. It underlined the need for a just mechanism for settlement of disputes between employers and employees.<sup>xvi</sup>

The Congress's views on the communal question were clearly brought out in the manifesto. It reiterated that communalism was inconsistent with both independence and the principles of democracy. It had only helped the British who ruled and exploited India. The solution for communalism rested solely in the goodwill and cooperation of the principal communities concerned. Whenever any group attempted to gain some concession or communal favour from the British government at the cost of another group, it resulted in an increase in communal tension and the exploitation of both groups by the government.<sup>xvii</sup> The manifesto underlined the importance of the communal question but clarified that not only had it nothing to do with religion, it also had nothing to do with the major problems of poverty and widespread unemployment in India. It also pointed out that "the peasantry, the workers, the traders and merchants and the lower middle class of all communities were in no way touched by it and their burden persisted".<sup>xviii</sup> For Nehru, political reactionaries were the bulwarks of communalism who gained strength and prominence because of the help given by the British government, striking at the "very root of national unity and Indian freedom".<sup>xix</sup> Nehru also emphasised the economic content of communalism by highlighting the struggle between the haves and have nots - Hindu *zamindars* in Bengal and Muslim agriculturists/tenants and in the Punjab and Sind, bankers and richer classes who were generally Hindus and debtors were Muslim agriculturists. Muslim communalists could exploit the antagonism. He recognised that the situation had all the potential of developing into a struggle between economic classes but was equally aware that in such an eventuality, the communal leaders representing the upper classes of all groups would patch up their differences against the common class enemy. He believed that even before the development of the struggle between economic classes, the patch up of differences was not difficult if the third party was not present.<sup>xx</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, who had drafted the Congress manifesto,<sup>xxi</sup> was aware of the ease with which religious passions could be fanned when a third party in control could play off one group against another.<sup>xxii</sup>

The criticism of the Congress manifesto that its agrarian programme was not radical and that it bore the imprints of the influence of landed interests within the working committee<sup>xxiii</sup> is not only harsh but also uncalled for. It will be sufficient to point out that there

were several *zamindars* in the executive council of United Provinces and yet it decided to give a no- tax call during the Civil Disobedience Movement. Tasadduk Sherwani who belonged to a well-known *zamindari* family, by virtue of being the president of the Provincial Congress was the ex-officio head of the executive council and the agrarian committee pleaded before the Congress Working Committee the case for a no - tax campaign.<sup>xxiv</sup> The suggestion that the manifesto indicated the concerns of the non – *Bhumihars* in the Congress about the use of the Kisan Sabha in factional struggles and also that the growing popularity of the Kisan Sabha leaders was a constant source of fear among the non – *Bhumihar* Congress leaders, which influenced the Congress Working Committee to reject any radical reform programmes,<sup>xxv</sup> betrays a lack of understanding of the Congress programme and policies. It also betrays lack of recognition of the fact that Swami Shajanand was a member of the Provincial Congress Committee and that the leadership of Congress and *Kisan Sabha* was more or less common.<sup>xxvi</sup> In the face of state repression in 1933 when most of the Congress leadership was in jail and continuation of *Satyagraha* had almost become impossible, the *Kisan Sabha* under the leadership of Shahjanand kept the *Satyagraha* alive.<sup>xxvii</sup> It is important to remember here that the Congress manifesto was drawn for the elections to be held across India and not specifically for Bihar.

It is not surprising therefore that the landlords were beginning to organise to offset the growing influence of the *Kisan Sabha*, particularly against the fear that the *Kisan Sabha* might launch a no-rent campaign. In June, a large representative meeting of Muslim landlords decided that landlords must control the no- rent movement of the *Kisan Sabha*, particularly seeing that the Congress did not appear able to control these groups.<sup>xxviii</sup> Had they been powerful within the Congress this would not have become a necessity.

The landlord element was becoming increasingly concerned with the growing influence of the Left wing and the seeming helplessness of the Congress to do anything about it. One landlord maintained, “Congress ministers are not their own masters. Their hands are being forced by a vocal and virile section of their adherents who are carrying on a whirlwind campaign against the *zamindars*, painting them in the blackest colours”.<sup>xxix</sup> During August 1937 a number of landlords’ meetings expressed concern at the rising tide of rural violence.<sup>xxx</sup> These meetings culminated in a large representative meeting on 16 and 17 September held under the auspices of Bihar Landholders’ Association.<sup>xxxi</sup> The temper of the meeting can be gauged by a resolution calling for the landlords of the province to launch a civil disobedience movement against any unjust law, which might be passed.<sup>xxxii</sup> They did not align themselves either with the Muslim League or any other Muslim party, having practically no or very little

radical or moderate agrarian programme that had come up to contest the elections and had a fair chance of winning Muslim reserved seats. Rather, they aligned themselves with Hindu landlords, thereby giving their fear a class colour than a religious one. They were trying to protect their class/economic hegemony by expressing their class-solidarity along with their Hindu counterparts and did not take the communal course. Moreover, the Governor of Bihar province asked the *zamindars* to organise and improve their relations with the peasantry in order to forestall congress and its increasing appeal among the peasants.<sup>xxxiii</sup>

The All India Muslim League's election manifesto reiterated that the League would work to protect and safeguard the position of the Muslim community in the political and constitutional structure. It argued that this stance of the Muslim League should not be viewed as communal. The manifesto stressed the need that the minorities must be made to feel that they could rely on the majority with a complete sense of confidence and security. This sense of confidence and security, according to League's manifesto, emanated from safeguarding the provisions of separate electorate.<sup>xxxiv</sup> This critical emphasis on separate electorate was at best a continuation of the colonial prescription to the communal question. It could not have provided anything other than what it was designed for – the development of two separate body politic. The manifesto cautioned the Muslims from getting exploited on economic or any other grounds because it was detrimental to the solidarity of the community.<sup>xxxv</sup> This was a classic example of the petty concerns of the communal leadership overriding the day-to-day and long-term concerns of the masses. It was suggesting that the economic backwardness/problems of Muslims were different from that of other communities. Creating such a divide in the secular interests of the masses on religious lines further alienated the communities, which resulted into conflict and hampered any mass action for a progressive economic programme.

It has been argued that the Muslim League wanted to fight the elections on an economic and social programme, which was similar to that of the Congress.<sup>xxxvi</sup> But it is important to note that the reason behind rejecting the Government of India Act (1935) were very different for the two parties. The League rejected it because the Act fell very short in safeguarding the political rights of the Muslims, but it also made clear that it accepted the Communal Award, which was a part of the Act, till a substitute was agreed upon. The Muslim League fought the election because it wanted to work the Constitution so that it may be utilised for what it was worth. The Indian National Congress, on the other hand, rejected the Act for it being inconsistent with independence and the principle of democracy. The League manifesto was silent on the question of tenancy and related agrarian programmes whereas the

Congress had made several progressive proposals. The Indian National Congress contested the election in order to prevent the operation of the Act by forces calculated to strengthen alien domination and exploitation. This difference was very important because the candidates of respective parties in constituencies reserved for Muslims would be campaigning on grounds so diverse from each other that they at times may have appeared divided on communal lines, to rally support for themselves and canvas for their party programmes.

Four other Muslim political parties came up just before the elections, out of which the two most important were: (1) the Bihar Muslim United Party and (2) The Bihar Muslim Independent Party. The other two were the Ahrar Party and the Radical Muslim party. These newly formed parties claimed that they were concerned with the problems of Muslims in the province of Bihar. All of them argued that all-India parties could not represent the needs and aspirations of the Muslims of Bihar.

Saiyed Abdul Aziz led the Bihar Muslim United party. It held its first session at Patna on 3 October, 1936 under the presidentship of Khan Bahadur Nawab S.M. Ismail. The party originated in an informal meeting on 29<sup>th</sup> July 1935 with the object of organising Muslim opinion in Bihar and form a strong organisation to work the Constitution in the best interest of the community. Its leadership was of the view that Muslims were suffering due to its own neglect in achieving progress, and it was time that they took steps to remedy their drawbacks.<sup>xxxvii</sup> The objective of the party was to work the Constitution mainly for the benefits of the Muslim community. the party leadership highlighted that the fate of the Muslims was at risk because better organised and disciplined parties were encroaching upon the rights and privileges of the Muslims.<sup>xxxviii</sup> It appears that he was referring to the Indian National Congress because there was hardly any other organisation in Bihar at that time which could be called better organised and disciplined. Nothing could have been farther from the truth. The Fundamental Rights Resolution of the Karachi Congress was included in the Congress manifesto.<sup>xxxix</sup> What seemed to have provoked Nawab Sahib to level such accusations against the Congress was Congress's rejection of the Communal Award. During his address Nawab Sahib expressed his anguish at the hostility towards the Communal Award in the garb of so-called nationalism by all the organisations of the majority community.<sup>xl</sup> He therefore appealed to Muslims not to be led away by catchwords like 'Independence' as the meaning of the words was vague.<sup>xli</sup>

The other important Muslim political party in the province was the Bihar Muslim Independent Party led by Md. Sajjad with the assistance of Syed Mohammad.<sup>xlii</sup> The party held its first session at Patna on 12 September, 1936 under the presidency of Maulana Ahmad

Sayed, Secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulemai-Hind. The objective of the party was to achieve complete independence and at the same time to safeguard Muslim religion and culture and form a government based on Muslim religious tenets.<sup>xliii</sup> The Bihar Muslim Independent Party leadership maintained that the Communal Award was the emblem of India's misfortune and that this was more against the Muslims than the Hindus.<sup>xliv</sup> It also said that the opposition to the Award was opposition to the freedom of the country.<sup>xlv</sup> These objectives were extremely ambiguous and left a lot to be explained.

Both these parties wanted Muslims to unite to assert their political and religious rights and to safeguard them by supporting these parties and therefore, their ideas on the question of community and independence by voting for them in the coming elections. What kind of relations they would maintain with the majority community and other minorities of the province does not appear in their rhetoric? They did not forward any concrete programme for ameliorating the Muslim masses from their present state. They were appealing to the religious sentiments of Muslims but not committing themselves to any definite solution of the problems gripping the common Muslims of the province. Such ideas are always a challenge to secular leaders and organisations.

Indian National Congress launched its election campaign on 8 July, 1936.<sup>xlvi</sup> Sardar Patel pointed out that the Indian freedom struggle would be fought outside the legislature in the fields and factories across India but it would be disastrous to neglect the parliamentary programme. He underlined the reasons behind the Congress contesting the elections. The Congress would have to prevent any misuse of the legislature and work it for whatever benefit that could be brought to the Indian people. He pointed out that the first task would be to revitalise the Congress machinery into election machinery.<sup>xlvii</sup>

In Bihar the Congress campaign started on 15 July, 1936. Election Officers were appointed in most of the districts and a general appeal signed by Rajendra Prasad, the president of the Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee, asking the people to support the Congress candidates irrespective of caste, creed and religion, was brought out.<sup>xlviii</sup> Since the Congress was fighting most of the general seats, it was therefore decided that the campaign had to reach the remotest parts of the districts and not to be confined to any particular part. Congress volunteers and candidates were asked to tour every village in their respective constituencies carrying with them campaign materials and Congress flags and under no circumstances miss out on any household while campaigning. They were asked to explain the Congress programme in each and every village of the province.<sup>xlix</sup> The scale of campaigning led to a man-to-man contact and a proper propagation of the party's ideology. The lack of



such an organisational strength among other parties might have been an added advantage for the Congress. A favourite Congress slogan was “If they feed you with *puris*, eat them, in the polling booth remember to be careful.” Many took this advice to heart. But of all the forms of electioneering that were employed, the most effective was the magic appeal of Mahatma Gandhi’s name.<sup>1</sup>

Things were not the same for the Muslim political parties. The Muslim League was in no way a potent force to reckon with during the 1937 elections. The Bihar Muslim United Party itself had come into being just a year or so ago. The same was the case with the Bihar Muslim Independent Party, which had its first session in September 1936. It was very difficult to establish election machinery with enough resources to fight elections in the whole province. The Independent Party was regarded as having an advanced political outlook among the Muslims and accommodated in its ranks, almost every possible shade of political opinion. They lacked organisation and suffered from the serious disadvantage of being regarded as pro-Government.<sup>ii</sup> The Ahrar Party too was in shambles. Led by Md. Shafi Daudi with its virtual headquarters at Muzaffarpur, but shown at Patna, just to attract Muslims in general, the party had no influence in South Bihar. The goal of the party was dominion status.<sup>iii</sup> Similar was the situation of the Radical Muslim Party. It was brought into being only on paper by one adventurous Muslim socialist, Wali Hussain of Bhagalpur.<sup>iiii</sup> Above all, there were a large number of Muslim candidates who did not stand on any party ticket.<sup>liv</sup>

All these Muslim political parties, except for the Radical Muslim Party, had their own mouthpieces. For the Bihar Muslim Independent Party, it was a bi-weekly Urdu paper, *Muslim*, edited by Abdul Baqui. The party also had a propaganda officer, Md. Ismail Wahshi.<sup>lv</sup> Initially, *Istakbal* was the mouthpiece for the Bihar Muslim Independent Party but later on, a fortnightly Urdu paper, *Naquib*, established and run by Md. Sajjad, who led this party, carried on the propaganda work.<sup>lvi</sup> The Urdu bi-weekly, *Ittehad*, which was published from Patna, was the mouthpiece of the Ahrar Party.<sup>lvii</sup> In contrast to all these, the Indian National Congress had no official newspaper or magazine of its own, but it had the organisation.

The other political party in the fray was the United Party. It was a political party organised by the *zamindars* of Bihar at the initiative of the Maharaja of Darbhanga. It had almost all the leading and important landlords of Bihar as its members. The banking, trading and commercial interests were also fully represented. The goal of the party was to attain complete dominion status within the British Empire through legitimate and constitutional means.<sup>lviii</sup> The Maharaja of Darbhanga in his address said that there should be no criticism of

the present Government.<sup>lix</sup> It is perhaps because of this stand taken up by the party that it spoke nothing about the Communal Award or the opinions of other political parties on this question. The Maharaja of Darbhanga, who himself was an important leader and financier of the Hindu Mahasabha,<sup>lx</sup> refrained from making any statement on the Communal Award and the communal situation. Anything said in favour of the Communal Award would have antagonised his friends in the Hindu Mahasabha and anything said against it would have alienated the Muslim *zamindars* from the party and pricked the British on the wrong side. For him, both of these possibilities were harmful. Since the party was primarily interested in protecting the *zamindari* system and wanted to thwart any radical tenancy reform, it therefore, described all the methods prejudicial to the British as negative and as evil presage for a future national government.<sup>lxi</sup>

The election started on 22 January, 1937. There were 152 constituencies out of which 139 were territorial constituencies and 13 were special constituencies. The territorial constituencies were further divided into 70 general (5 urban and 65 rural), 15 Scheduled Castes, 7 Backward Tribes, 39 Muslim (5 urban and 34 rural) and 4 women comprising 1 Muslim, 1 Anglo Indian and 2 European. 13 special constituencies comprised of 1 Indian Christian, 4 commerce and industry, mining and planting landholders, 3 labour (non-union) and 1 university.<sup>lxii</sup> The total number of voters was 4,412,229 out of which 2,010,664 were general, including 2,25,000 Scheduled Caste electors and 1,83,335 were women. The number of the Muslim electorate was 3,24,393 of which 31,854 were women. There were 2,963 Anglo-Indians and Europeans.<sup>lxiii</sup> The electoral rolls were compiled on the basis of *chaukidari* assessment and included the names of all matriculates and income tax assesseees. The names of wives of all such persons were also included.

The election result proved that the Congress Party had a mass appeal in the province. The Congress contested 107 seats and won 98, i.e., 65 per cent of the total seats and 92 per cent of the total seats contested. It won all the general urban seats and 68 out of 73 general rural seats. In the Scheduled Caste constituencies, the Congress won 14 out of 15 seats and in Muslim reserved constituencies it won 5 out of 7 seats contested. It secured 3 out of 4 seats reserved for women and 2 out of 3 seats reserved for labour.<sup>lxiv</sup> This result was not possible if the Congress was a landlord supporting an upper caste, semi-Hindu communal party as it was projected by its critics then and continues to be portrayed such till now.

The Bihar Muslim United Party won 8 seats in total. Out of these seats 1 was Muslim-urban and 7 Muslim-rural. The Muslim Independent Party captured 20 seats out of which 2 were Muslim-urban and 18 were Muslim-rural. The Muslim League won 2 seats of which 1

from Muslim-urban and 1 from Muslim-rural. The Ahrar Party bagged 3 seats and all of them were from Muslim-urban. 4 seats went to no party.<sup>lxv</sup> From the result it is evident that the Muslim Independent Party won the maximum number of seats reserved for Muslims. It won 2 out of 5 Muslim urban constituencies and 18 out of 34 Muslim rural constituencies, i.e., taken together, it won more than 50 per cent of the total seats reserved for the Muslims.

<sup>i</sup>D. D. Basu, *Introduction to the Constitution of India*, Wadhwa and Company Law Publishers, New Delhi, 2002, p. 9.

<sup>ii</sup>G. S. P. Ambastha, *Congress Government in Bihar*, Classical Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1985, pp. 14-15.

<sup>iii</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 17

<sup>iv</sup>*Indian Annual Register*, 1936, Vol.2, p. 188.

<sup>v</sup>*Indian Annual Register*, 1936, Vol.1, pp. 299-300.

<sup>vi</sup>*Indian Annual Register*, 1936, Vol.2, pp. 271-272.

<sup>vii</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 321.

<sup>viii</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 188.

<sup>ix</sup>*Indian Annual Register*, 1936, Vol.1, p. 300.

<sup>x</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>xi</sup>*Political Special*, File No. 43, 1936, Bihar State Archives, Patna

<sup>xii</sup>Rakesh Gupta, *Bihar Peasantry and the Kisan Sabha*, Peoples Publishing House, New Delhi, 1982, pp. 79-80. The zamindars of Bihar organized themselves into a political party in a meeting held at Ranchi on 4 September 1936 at the initiative of Maharaja of Darbhanga.

<sup>xiii</sup>*Indian Annual Register*, 1936, Vol.2, p. 188.

<sup>xiv</sup>Sulekha Das, *Congress at the Helm: Bihar, 1937-1939*, (Bahri Publications, New Delhi), pp. 211-212.

<sup>xv</sup>*Indian Annual Register*, 1936, Vol.2, p. 190.

<sup>xvi</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 190 - 191 also Sulekha Das, *op. cit.*, pp. 229-230.

<sup>xvii</sup>*Indian Annual Register*, 1936, Vol.2, pp. 190-191.

<sup>xviii</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>xix</sup>Jawaharlal Nehru, *Autobiography*, Penguin Books, India, 2017, p.144

<sup>xx</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.148-149

<sup>xxi</sup>Rajendra Prasad, *Autobiography*, Penguin Books, India, 2010, p. 410

<sup>xxii</sup>Jawaharlal Nehru, *Autobiography*, *op. cit.*, p. 143

<sup>xxiii</sup>Gilbert McDonald, *BIHAR POLITY, 1908-1937: THE BIHAR CONGRESS AND THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGION*, (unpublished thesis, University of Western Australia, 1978) pp. 400 – 404.

<sup>xxiv</sup>Jawaharlal Nehru, *Autobiography*, *op. cit.*, p.323

<sup>xxv</sup>Gilbert McDonald, *op. cit.*

<sup>xxvi</sup>Rajendra Prasad, *Autobiography*, *op. cit.*, p. 413

<sup>xxvii</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 347 - 349

<sup>xxviii</sup>Gilbert McDonald, *op. cit.*, pp. 408 – 409.

<sup>xxix</sup>*The Indian Nation*, Patna, 10 August 1937

<sup>xxx</sup>*The Indian Nation*, 2 November 1937

<sup>xxxi</sup>*Bihar Landholders' Association Report*. p. 98.

<sup>xxxii</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>xxxiii</sup>Rajendra Prasad, *Autobiography*, *op. cit.*, p. 437

<sup>xxxiv</sup>*Indian Annual Register*, 1936, Vol.1, p.299

<sup>xxxv</sup>*Ibid.*, p.301

<sup>xxxvi</sup>Jinnah tried to form a central parliamentary board under the aegis of the Muslim League, to approve a list of candidates to fight the elections as an all India party standing for an economic and social programme similar to that of Congress – calling for full democratic self-government, free and compulsory primary education, the relief of rural indebtedness, the development of cottage industry and the state regulation of currency and prices in such a way as to promote a production 'take off'. Peter Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1972), *Archives.org*, p. 224

<sup>xxxvii</sup>*Indian Annual Register*, 1936, vol.1, pp. 271-272.

<sup>xxxviii</sup>*Ibid*

- xxxix Khursheed Kamal, *A Documentary Record of the Congress Government 1937 – 1939 (Related to Muslims Under Their Rule)*, Vol.1, National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad, 1979, p. 52.
- xl *Indian Annual Register*, 1936, Vol.2, pp. 272-273
- xli *Ibid.*
- xlii *Political Special*, File No. 43/1936, Bihar State Archives, Patna.
- xliii *Indian Annual Register*, 1936, Vol.2, pp. 272-273.
- xliv *Ibid.*
- xlvi *Ibid.*
- xlv *The Searchlight*, 8 July 1936
- xlvii “There is considerable potentiality of mischief though there may be little scope for good, in the legislatures, and the Congress has decided to take all possible steps to prevent the people who are likely to use them in such a manner as to retard the progress of the country.” *Ibid.*
- xlviii *The Searchlight*, 15 July 1936
- lix *The Searchlight*, 6 December 1936
- l *The Searchlight*, 11 January 1939.
- li *The Searchlight*, 11 January 1936. The Independent Party had complete independence as its object but attempts were being made to modify this clause to attract loyal Muslims. *Political Special*, File No. 43,1936, Bihar State Archive, Patna
- lii *Political Special*, File No.43/1936, Bihar State Archives, Patna.
- liii *Ibid.*
- liv *The Searchlight*, Patna, January 1939.
- lv *Political Special*, File No.43/1936, Bihar State Archives, Patna.
- lvi *Ibid.*
- lvii *Ibid.*
- lviii Rakesh Gupta, *op. cit.*, pp.79-80.
- lix *Ibid.*, p.81.
- lx *Ibid.*, p.82.
- lxi *Ibid.*
- lxii *Government of India, Home Department (Public)* File No. 305/37, National Archives of India, New Delhi.
- lxiii K.K. Datta, *Freedom Movement in Bihar*, Vol. 2, Government of Bihar, Patna 1957 p. 281
- lxiv *Ibid.*, pp. 275-276
- lxv *Ibid.*

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