

"EXPLORING THE COMPLEX DYNAMICS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDIA-CHINA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS"

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Abstract

India and China are getting closer to each other because they are both the biggest and fastest-growing in the world of international politics, there are growing powers on the Asian continent. This is true because both countries are in Asia. There are many clear connections between these two cultures, like the fact that they have the same history and civilization, want to be global superpowers again, and want to move forward and become more modern. This deal is good for both sides for more than one reason. But they have a lot of problems that make it hard for them to get along. The biggest ones are territorial disputes that have been going on for a long time, differences over who should be in charge of a region, and bigger diplomatic problems (particularly pertaining to China-Pakistan and India-United States connections). Relationships are made harder by bigger diplomatic problems, long-standing territorial disputes, and fights over who is the strongest in the region. Even though these problems still exist, the relationship has not improved. Because of this, there are many things about India and China's relationship that can be seen as both good and bad. This is why some people call the ties between the two countries "two-edged swords." This is because both India and China have had empires rule over their own lands for a long time. The goal of this paper is to look at the history and current state of such a fundamental dynamic in the context of diplomatic ties between New Delhi and Beijing over the past 75 years. It also looks at how their long-term goals are both the same and different.

Keywords: India-China-Pakistan, India's Nuclear Policy, Two-front war, Strategic Chain

Introduction

The standoff at Doklam from June to August 2017 brought the relationship between China and India to the attention of the whole world. Even though the fight was settled without violence, relations are at their worst since the late 1960s. A new worry is that the strategic triangle between India, China, and Pakistan has once again come to the fore. After Doklam,

both the head of the Indian army and the head of the Indian air force have talked about how the country is getting ready for a war with both China and Pakistan. The triangle between India, China, and Pakistan is one of the most volatile and dangerous ways for countries to work together. Nearly half of the world's people live in these three countries. They have the second, first, and sixth most people in the world, respectively. The armed forces have the third, first, and sixth most active members in the world, respectively. They have about 500 nuclear weapons between them, with China having about half of them. India and Pakistan have fought four wars and dealt with a number of crises. India and China, on the other hand, have only fought one war and had a number of smaller conflicts, the most recent of which was in Doklam from June to August 2017. **(Dai, 2016)**

Most people think that China and Pakistan have always worked together against India. In fact, China has tilted the triangle in different ways at different times. So, from 1949 to 1958, India and China got along well, and both countries were wary of Pakistan because of its ties to the US. China and Pakistan's relationship was at its best from 1959 to 1989, when the two countries worked together against India. China became more neutral between India and Pakistan after the Cold War ended. Since 2015, China has once again turned more strongly toward Pakistan. **(Das Gupta & Lüthi, 2016)**

Objective of paper

1. Discuss about Nuclear Strategy
2. Discuss about Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Policy
3. Discuss about Conflict *India-China-Pakistan*

India's Nuclear Policy and Why It Wants Nuclear Weapons

India has not taken any steps toward acquiring nuclear weapons or joining either of the two major power blocs since gaining independence in 1947. Also, India's then-prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, loudly and publicly denounced nuclear weapons. Despite this, the government of India established an atomic research division in 1954. China's nuclear test in 1964, China's threat to intervene in the India-Pakistan war in 1965, and the refusal of the other nuclear powers to provide India with a security guarantee³ all contributed to India abandoning its anti-nuclear stance after its humiliating loss in the 1962 border war with

China. The NPT was also rejected by India. Instead, it conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 for peaceful purposes (PNE). While the nuclear test demonstrated India's continued capability to produce nuclear weapons in the future, the government of India has been clear that it has no current intentions to do so. India's "option policy," then, was the PNE. In addition, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India established a state of emergency in the country from 1975 till 1977. This caused tensions at home. She also reversed course on nuclear power development after losing the national election in 1977. Successor Morarji Desai was a staunch pacifist who disagreed with the use of nuclear weapons. As soon as he was sworn in as prime minister, he made a public pledge to end India's nuclear testing programme. After Indira Gandhi's return to power in 1980, however, the Indian nuclear programme was revived. In 1983, in response to rumours of Pakistan's covert nuclear project, India boosted funds for the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and initiated the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP).

It is said that in 1988, while Rajiv Gandhi was Prime Minister of India, he gave the order for nuclear weapons to be produced. After then, India dedicated itself entirely to developing its logistics infrastructure. Their first Agni intermediate-range ballistic missile test was conducted in 1989. India's option policy regarding nuclear testing was pushed over the edge by the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, China's persistent support for Pakistan, and the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. (Marie and Shinichi 2003). Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India's prime minister at the time, made it clear in 1996 that India would not compromise its sovereignty or national security under these circumstances. Also, "We don't want Pakistan or China to blow up India because we don't have enough nuclear capability to stop them," he stated. Vajpayee oversaw India's two nuclear test explosions in May 1998. On May 11, 1998, three devices were put through their paces at the Pokhran underground testing facility. On the 13th of May, 1998, there were two further tests. We have a publicly nuclear-armed state on our borders, a state that invaded India with force in 1962," Vajpayee wrote to US President Clinton shortly after the nuclear tests. This is supported by research (Chellaney 1998). India has reason to be concerned about its security since China was assisting Pakistan in developing nuclear and missile capabilities. India's primary motivations for developing nuclear weapons were, therefore, China and Pakistan. It is believed, however, that India's nuclear weapons are purely political tools, with the only aim of discouraging India's opponents from making nuclear threats. In a speech to Parliament in

May 1998, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced that his country has acquired nuclear weapons. We won't be using these weapons to invade or threaten any nation. Instead, they are for self-defense, meaning India won't be threatened or coerced by nuclear weapons. On August 17, 1999, the government received the first draught of a nuclear doctrine created by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), which was headed by K. Subrahmanyam. Although not yet a government document, the doctrine represents the greatest possible middle ground for India's divergent viewpoints. "credible minimum nuclear deterrence"⁶ and "no first use" of nuclear weapons are outlined in the doctrine as the foundation of India's nuclear strategy. However, it stresses the need of establishing minimal nuclear deterrence in a manner that doesn't stifle innovation and scientific inquiry. (Fingar, 2010)

Why and How China Wants Nukes and Its Nuclear Strategy

After 1949, China was unhappy with how the globe was divided between two superpowers, but it was unable to do anything about it. It has been at war with the United States since the 1950s over the Korean peninsula and has been subjected to American hostility ever since, including diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, and military pressure. As a result, the events of the 1950s, when the United States threatened to deploy nuclear weapons against Beijing amid crises in the Taiwan Strait and the Korean War, were largely responsible for China's concerns about nuclear coercion. In 1956, China's leader, Mao Zedong, claimed that his country "also needs the atom bomb" and that the United States should produce nuclear weapons (Chansoria 2013). To paraphrase another statement: "We need this thing if we don't want to be terrified as a nation." On October 16, 1964, China detonated a fission device in Lop Nor in Xinjiang, officially making it a nuclear power. The Soviet Union often assisted China in the development of nuclear weapons. The Soviet technicians departed China and ties worsened between the two nations following the Ussuri River incident⁸ in the middle of the 1960s. Because of this, China has strengthened its defence measures against the Soviet Union. However, Beijing does not believe the new Russian government constitutes a significant enough military danger to warrant nuclear preparations at this time. What the United States can do and its strategy are the only things that matter for its nuclear deterrent posture (Banerjee 2010). The manner in which China launched its nuclear weapons project provides more evidence that nuclear weapons cannot be used to wage or win a war. Instead, its nuclear arsenal is primarily intended to halt and reverse any military pressure from

elsewhere. China's nuclear specialists and officials believe that part of their country's nuclear arsenal may withstand a nuclear assault or an attack on China's nuclear weapons using conventional weapons. As a result, China may potentially retaliate with nuclear weapons. Chinese officials believe they must have the option to deploy nuclear weapons to deter foreign militaristic pressure. China kept quiet about its nuclear philosophy when it became a nuclear power in 1964. However, it has maintained a nuclear strategy that calls for a minimum deterrence and a pledge to avoid initiating nuclear conflict. A nuclear weapons race would be very expensive to stop. Furthermore, it might be argued that the sole claimed rationale for acquiring these weapons was to deter pressure and blackmail from the other nuclear powers, namely the United States and the Soviet Union. **(Korolev, 2020)**

China tilts to India, 1949 to 1958

Between the years 1949 and 1958, China and India were quite close. This was in part due to the fact that both countries viewed the United States with suspicion and were concerned about the likelihood of instability in the region surrounding them in Asia. Both were within a short distance to the Soviet Union. Despite its disagreements with Moscow, China was a member of the communist coalition that fought against the alliance system headed by the United States. India was a non-aligned nation, but they looked forward to the Soviet Union for their economic development and saw Western imperialism as the greater danger. Because of Pakistan's close relations to the United States, both China and India viewed the country with a healthy amount of mistrust. Both of these groups held the view that Pakistan's Islamic basic values were incompatible with their own secular perspectives. **(Bajpai, Ho, & Miller, 2020)**

China tilts to Pakistan, 1959-1989

Beijing and New Delhi began to drift away, which ultimately led to war in 1962. This divergence was precipitated by the escalation of tensions between China and India over their shared border, which began in 1954 and continued on until the exile of the Dalai Lama in 1959. During this time, China and Pakistan came closer together, with the 1963 agreement that resolved their geographical disagreements serving as the cornerstone of their relationship. Between the years of 1959 and 1989, they functioned as de facto allies, despite the absence of a written pact stating that they would support one another in times of need.

However, from Delhi's perspective, China and Pakistan operated in the same manner as allies, despite the fact that China did not become involved in any of the conflicts between India and Pakistan that occurred in 1965 or 1971.

Even though China and Pakistan presented an unified front against India (with China providing Pakistan with diplomatic backing and shipments of armaments), China's reasons for doing so were not straightforward. Beijing desired to wean Islamabad away from its too cosy connection with the United States government in Washington. This was in part due to the fact that Pakistan is geographically located in close proximity to Tibet and Xinjiang, which makes it an excellent listening post and a possible base for the United States. In addition to this, Pakistan served as an important intermediary for the Muslim world, notably in the Gulf and the Middle East. Even though China gave Pakistan with diplomatic and military support (including help with nuclear and missile technology), there is evidence to suggest that the relationship was not entirely one-sided. Islamabad was able to pay off its obligations by acting as a mediator between the United States and China during the period of 1971-1972. In a practical sense, it allowed China to get the centrifuge technology that its nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, had already stolen from his former employers in the Netherlands. It also provided Chinese military specialists with access to US military equipment, which assisted them in reverse engineering a variety of systems. In addition, during the period from 1979 and 1989, Pakistan collaborated with the United States and China to wage an armed insurgency against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Lastly, China maintained tight ties with Pakistan in order to provide Islamabad an incentive to crack down on Uighur separatists who operated from Pakistani soil or whose activities were sponsored by Pakistani extremist organisations. (Upadhya, 2012)

China tilts away from Pakistan, 1990 to 2015

From 1954 onwards, but particularly when the Dalai Lama escaped to India in 1959, tensions on the border between India and China grew, and by 1962, the two countries were at war. Meanwhile, ties between China and Pakistan strengthened thanks to the 1963 treaty that settled border disputes between the two countries. Tacit since no official commitment to defend each other's interests was ever made, their alliance lasted from 1959 to 1989. Delhi, on the other hand, saw China and Pakistan as friends, despite the fact that China did not

directly participate in either the 1965 or 1971 India-Pakistan conflicts. China had complicated motivations for supporting Pakistan in its fight against India, despite the fact that the two countries presented an unified front. Beijing hoped to separate Islamabad from Washington by straining ties between the two countries. The proximity of Xinjiang and Tibet to Pakistan made it a perfect listening post and possible base for the Americans. Especially in the Gulf and the Middle East, Pakistan served as an important intermediary for the Muslim world. (Lintner, 2019)

China has supplied Pakistan with diplomatic and military support (including nuclear and missile help), but the relationship was not one-sided, as shown by the fact that China also received assistance from Pakistan. Islamabad paid back its obligations by mediating the peace treaty between the United States and China in 1971 and 1972. The technology behind China's centrifuges was stolen by the country's nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, from his former Dutch employers, and this deal made that technology available to China. It allowed Chinese military personnel access to US military hardware, which they used to develop backdoors and reverse engineering tools. Pakistan also collaborated with the United States and China to fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Last but not least, China maintained tight ties to Pakistan to give Islamabad an incentive to crack down on Uighur rebels based in or receiving assistance from Pakistan.

China tilts back to Pakistan, 2015 onwards

By the time Xi visited Pakistan in April 2015, Beijing was once again leaning toward Islamabad. This may be traced back to May 2014, when Narendra Modi became India's prime leader and instituted a more aggressive approach against China. Although ties between India and China were friendly in the weeks after Modi's arrival in Delhi, the new prime minister has already begun building an anti-China alliance including the United States, Japan, Australia, and Vietnam.

Between August and December of 2014, Modi visited all of these nations in a flurry of activity. In January 2015, President Obama became the first sitting U.S. president to attend India's Republic Day parade. During his stay, Obama signed a vision statement outlining future plans for US-India collaboration in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. Modi spoke at length about India's concerns over China, particularly Beijing's operations in the

contested waters of Northeast and Southeast Asia, with all four nations. He took a hard line with Beijing on bilateral relationships, insisting that progress on a border deal came first and then normalisation of relations. **(Jha, 2017)**

Whether or not in direct reaction, China recently announced a \$64 billion investment plan in Pakistan's infrastructure. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) incorporates the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Beijing generally disregarded Delhi's concerns that the corridor between China and Pakistan would pass through Pakistan-backed Kashmir. The deterioration of relations persisted. Despite China's promise to rename the CPEC as the BRI, India still decided against participating. In return, Beijing has voiced its opposition to India's participation in the Nuclear Suppliers Organization and to UN actions taken against Masood Azhar, the commander of the Jaish e Mohammed, a terrorist group based in Pakistan that is blamed for terror strikes in India. In October 2017, as India and the United States stepped up their anti-terror diplomatic campaign against Pakistan, Beijing defended Islamabad, saying that the Pakistani capital was really at the forefront of the global battle against terrorism. **(Zhu, 2017)**

A Triangle Made in History

For a very long time, India, Pakistan, and China have been at odds over their shared borders. India and China have fought on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), while India and Pakistan have fought on the Line of Control (LoC). Britain departed the subcontinent abruptly in 1947 as a result of decolonization after World War II. As a result, governmental frontiers in Southern Asia were redrawn in a disorganised fashion, making some territory available for conquest. India and Pakistan have fought four wars with each other since 1947. In 1962, India and China fought a border war. The Line of Actual Control and the Line of Control are places where India, China, and Pakistan often fight. All of these problems can be traced back to that long-ago time. After the Sino-Indian Border War in 1962, Beijing and Islamabad signed the 1963 Border Delimitation Agreement. This changed how the militaries of the three countries worked together. India doesn't like this deal because Pakistan gave China a piece of land in Kashmir called the Trans-Karakoram tract.. This meant that the war was now being fought on all three nations' soil. **(Chellaney, 2011)**

When the US didn't get involved in the India-Pakistan War of 1965, Pakistan thought it had been tricked by the US. As a result, it got closer to China. Pakistan thought that the U.S. would be on its side because of the U.S.-Pakistan Mutual Defense Agreement from 1954 and the fact that Pakistan was part of U.S.-made alliances like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization. But the United States helped India's military fight against Communist China during and after the 1962 conflict in a way that had never been done before. Because of this, it was smart for China and Pakistan to work together. Washington thought that if it armed both Pakistan and India, it could stop communism from spreading in Asia, which was one of the main goals of the Cold War. However, neither Pakistan nor India trusted Washington's claims that the weapons were not intended for use in a conflict between the two countries. China did not provide Pakistan with any direct military aid during the 1965 war, but it did attempt to terrify India by claiming that New Delhi was becoming aggressive along the India–China boundary and threatening to strike back. (Lüthi, 2016)

During and after the India-Pakistan War of 1971, the US supported Pakistan because it needed Pakistani help to start peace talks with China in 1972. The United States' last struggle of the Cold War began in Afghanistan in 1979, and Pakistan was there on the front lines. Since geopolitics was more important to Washington than stopping the spread of WMD, it disregarded warnings that China was assisting Pakistan in building a nuclear weapon. Attempts at compromise by the Reagan administration did not bode well for ties between the United States and India. After the Cold War ended, China became a world power, and India followed suit not long after. This changed India and China's cooperative relationship, making them more competitive with one another and enhancing China's military ties to Pakistan. Terrorist strikes in India that had their roots in Pakistan, however, caused tensions between the two countries to linger and even escalate. This made it harder to get things back to normal. (Maxwell, 2018)

Conflict Scenarios

Maximizing interest via capacity enhancement is central to the regional stances of China, India, and Pakistan as well as U.S. strategy in Southern Asia. Both internal and external balance may achieve this goal. Given the already precarious security situation, this raises the

stakes and raises the spectre of conflict. The following paragraphs explore some possible disagreements. (Mehra, 1991)

Two-front war

India worries about a two-front war with China or Pakistan because their border disputes haven't been resolved and because Beijing and Islamabad have a strong military and strategic alliance. Indian military leaders have said that they are ready for this to happen. "Two-front is a real situation," said General Bipin Rawat, who was head of the Indian Army and is now India's Chief of Defense Staff. Since then, we've been able to change a lot. The Army, the Navy, and the IAF are all now very ready for something like this to happen. India's military plans for a two-front war include increasing its overall deterrent capability and credibility, making progress in the acquisition and production of military equipment, recalibrating its military strategy, training to fit the needs of the situation, and improving border infrastructure. Building infrastructure in border areas and arguing over who has the best land has caused a lot of trouble, as seen in the fights between Indian and Chinese forces in eastern Ladakh and the Doklam standoff. (Malone, C. Raja, & Raghavan, 2015)

Even though it makes sense for the Indian military to say that it is ready, others are not so sure. India and China fighting would probably be used by Pakistan to open a second front along the Line of Control. If India and Pakistan go to war, China could also open a second front at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) or in the Indian Ocean area. Even scarier, China and Pakistan could be planning to attack India with the military. Indian Army Chief M M Naravane said earlier this year, "It can happen anywhere, but the borders of these two countries meet at Siachen and Shaksgam Valley." People are most likely to work together on the strategically important glacier that makes us keep our possessions. In this kind of situation, he said, "For years, we've been focusing on the western border because that's where the dangers are." Now, we have to send more soldiers to the north." No matter how likely such a situation is, how people see it as a threat is likely to affect both India's military readiness and how it acts. (Noorani, 2010)

More than a Triangle: The Strategic Chain

More and more strategic analysts agree that the best way to describe security in Southern Asia is as a triangle, not as India and Pakistan. But outside players have a big effect on what keeps happening in this triangle, so might be better to think of regional dynamics as a strategic chain in which the United States is the most powerful outside player. The triangle and the strategic chain are two ways to look at geopolitics in Southern Asia. But these two ways are not in conflict with each other. Even though the inherent security dilemma in the triangle of India, Pakistan, and China is still a major factor in determining regional security, the full picture can be seen by looking at how the U.S. role complicates responses and counter-reactions in this triangle. The U.S. and India work together because of worries about China's rise. China and Pakistan see this as a threat, and India is worried about China and Pakistan working together. How safe the area is depends on all of these things. **(Palit, 1991)**

New Delhi has sought out to China's neighbours in an effort to negotiate agreements with Southeast and East Asian nations as China's influence rises in India's maritime and continental surrounds. China and India pose an increasing military danger to each other on land and water. New Delhi and Washington have begun cooperating more because of this, and also because both China and the US aim to govern the globe. On the one hand, Beijing tries to convince New Delhi that India would be better off not fully supporting the US against China. To do this, it hosts meetings between top leaders from both countries and works with India in multilateral groups like the Brazil-Russia-India-China-Russia-South Africa (BRICS) group, the Russia-India-China (RIC) conference, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Beijing's controversial projects, like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), are meant to strengthen China's strategic ties with Pakistan. They also serve as a symbol for China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. This will cause India to feel even more alone (BRI). The U.S. strategy in the area depends on how people in the triangle see and respond to threats. So, the strategic chain is a great way to show how governments really work in South Asian countries. **(Sen, 2003)**

The Strategic Chain's Point of Friction

India, Pakistan, and China form a triangle based on how powerful and dangerous each country is seen to be. Things are getting worse in the area because the US and China are

fighting more and more. China's most reliable ally near India is still Pakistan, and India is still the only country in the area that can keep up with China's growing power. **(Sidhu & Jing Dong, 2003)**

The regional dispute might worsen if there is strain on the strategic network. India's application to the Nuclear Suppliers Group exemplifies how a partnership between India, China, Pakistan, and the United States might exacerbate tensions in Southern Asia. Since India refuses to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, China views India's offer as equivalent to Pakistan's and hence rejects it. Also, China has resisted attempts to have Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) chief Masood Azhar designated as a global terrorist by the UN Security Council. It wasn't until this past year that they finally moved on. China's economic and political involvement in Afghanistan is carried out via Pakistan, so if the US exits, the security situation there will also disrupt this strategic connection. What Islamabad done endeared the Taliban to the Chinese authorities. China is attempting to reduce communication between extremist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan and Xinjiang Province's Uighur rebels. New Delhi believes these changes are necessary because it must become simpler to work with all the elements crucial to Afghanistan's future. If the United States were to leave Afghanistan, the Taliban may reemerge as a political force, and Pakistan might try to reduce Indian dominance. This is why it's important to have open dialogue with the Taliban. These snags in the strategic network are making matters worse between India, Pakistan, and China. This makes the issues more difficult to address and more protracted in duration. **(Yoder & Kanti, 2020)**

Conclusion

India, Pakistan, and China form a triangle based on how powerful and dangerous each country is seen to be. Things are getting worse in the area because the US and China are fighting more and more. China's most reliable ally near India is still Pakistan, and India is still the only country in the area that can keep up with China's growing power. The security issue in the triangle will continue to worsen as a result of the power imbalance between India and Pakistan (which favours India) and the developing power imbalance between India and China (which favours China). China and Pakistan need to join forces to counter India's growing influence in the region. The triangle is further complicated by China's thoughts on a

U.S. strategy termed "containment" that involves India. The likelihood of crises and confrontations occurring at the LAC and LoC will increase as long as widespread distrust and the belief that there is no winner in the triangle persist. Disagreements will arise in international forums on the security situation in Afghanistan and the surrounding area, as well as counterterrorism and nonproliferation efforts. Diplomatic efforts and trust-building measures are futile because of the complicated dynamics in the India-Pakistan-China triangle, which are exacerbated by the United States' role in the region.

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to be global superpowers again, and want to move forward and become more modern. This deal is good for both sides for more than one reason. But they have a lot of problems that make it hard for them to get along. The biggest ones are territorial disputes that have been going on for a long time, differences over who should be in charge of a region, and bigger diplomatic problems (particularly pertaining to China-Pakistan and India-United States connections). Relationships are made harder by bigger diplomatic problems, long-standing territorial disputes, and fights over who is the strongest in the region. Even though these problems still exist, the relationship has not improved. Because of this, there are many things about India and China's relationship that can be seen as both good and bad. This is why some people call the ties between the two countries "two-edged swords." This is because both India and China have had empires rule over their own lands for a long time. The goal of this paper is to look at the history and current state of such a fundamental dynamic in the context of diplomatic ties between New Delhi and Beijing over the past 75 years. It also looks at how their long-term goals are both the same and different.

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Introduction

The standoff at Doklam from June to August 2017 brought the relationship between China and India to the attention of the whole world. Even though the fight was settled without violence, relations are at their worst since the late 1960s. A new worry is that the strategic triangle between India, China, and Pakistan has once again come to the fore. After Doklam, both the head of the Indian army and the head of the Indian air force have talked about how the country is getting ready for a war with both China and Pakistan. The triangle between India, China, and Pakistan is one of the most volatile and dangerous ways for countries to work together. Nearly half of the world's people live in these three countries. They have the second, first, and sixth most people in the world, respectively. The armed forces have the third, first, and sixth most active members in the world, respectively. They have about 500 nuclear weapons between them, with China having about half of them. India and Pakistan have fought four wars and dealt with a number of crises. India and China, on the other hand, have only fought one war and had a number of smaller conflicts, the most recent of which was in Doklam from June to August 2017. **(Dai, 2016)**

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1. Discuss about Nuclear Strategy
2. Discuss about Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Policy
3. Discuss about Conflict *India-China-Pakistan*

India's Nuclear Policy and Why It Wants Nuclear Weapons

India has not taken any steps toward acquiring nuclear weapons or joining either of the two major power blocs since gaining independence in 1947. Also, India's then-prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, loudly and publicly denounced nuclear weapons. Despite this, the government of India established an atomic research division in 1954. China's nuclear test in 1964, China's threat to intervene in the India-Pakistan war in 1965, and the refusal of the other nuclear powers to provide India with a security guarantee³ all contributed to India abandoning its anti-nuclear stance after its humiliating loss in the 1962 border war with China. The NPT was also rejected by India. Instead, it conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 for peaceful purposes (PNE). While the nuclear test demonstrated India's continued capability to produce nuclear weapons in the future, the government of India has been clear that it has no current intentions to do so. India's "option policy," then, was the PNE. In addition, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India established a state of emergency in the country from 1975 till 1977. This caused tensions at home. She also reversed course on nuclear power development after losing the national election in 1977. Successor Morarji Desai was a staunch pacifist who disagreed with the use of nuclear weapons. As soon as he was sworn in as prime minister, he made a public pledge to end India's nuclear testing programme. After Indira Gandhi's return to power in 1980, however, the Indian nuclear programme was revived. In 1983, in response to rumours of Pakistan's covert nuclear project, India boosted funds for the Defense Research

and Development Organization (DRDO) and initiated the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP).

It is said that in 1988, while Rajiv Gandhi was Prime Minister of India, he gave the order for nuclear weapons to be produced. After then, India dedicated itself entirely to developing its logistics infrastructure. Their first Agni intermediate-range ballistic missile test was conducted in 1989. India's option policy regarding nuclear testing was pushed over the edge by the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, China's persistent support for Pakistan, and the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. (Marie and Shinichi 2003). Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India's prime minister at the time, made it clear in 1996 that India would not compromise its sovereignty or national security under these circumstances. Also, "We don't want Pakistan or China to blow up India because we don't have enough nuclear capability to stop them," he stated. Vajpayee oversaw India's two nuclear test explosions in May 1998. On May 11, 1998, three devices were put through their paces at the Pokhran underground testing facility. On the 13th of May, 1998, there were two further tests. We have a publicly nuclear-armed state on our borders, a state that invaded India with force in 1962," Vajpayee wrote to US President Clinton shortly after the nuclear tests. This is supported by research (Chellaney 1998). India has reason to be concerned about its security since China was assisting Pakistan in developing nuclear and missile capabilities. India's primary motivations for developing nuclear weapons were, therefore, China and Pakistan. It is believed, however, that India's nuclear weapons are purely political tools, with the only aim of discouraging India's opponents from making nuclear threats. In a speech to Parliament in May 1998, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced that his country has acquired nuclear weapons. We won't be using these weapons to invade or threaten any nation. Instead, they are for self-defense, meaning India won't be threatened or coerced by nuclear weapons. On August 17, 1999, the government received the first draught of a nuclear doctrine created by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), which was headed by K. Subrahmanyam. Although not yet a government document, the doctrine represents the greatest possible middle ground for India's divergent viewpoints. "credible minimum nuclear deterrence" and "no first use" of nuclear weapons are outlined in the doctrine as the foundation of India's nuclear strategy. However, it stresses the need of establishing minimal nuclear deterrence in a manner that doesn't stifle innovation and scientific inquiry. (Fingar, 2010)

Why and How China Wants Nukes and Its Nuclear Strategy

After 1949, China was unhappy with how the globe was divided between two superpowers, but it was unable to do anything about it. It has been at war with the United States since the 1950s over the Korean peninsula and has been subjected to American hostility ever since, including diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, and military pressure. As a result, the events of the 1950s, when the United States threatened to deploy nuclear weapons against Beijing amid crises in the Taiwan Strait and the Korean War, were largely responsible for China's concerns about nuclear coercion. In 1956, China's leader, Mao Zedong, claimed that his country "also needs the atom bomb" and that the United States should produce nuclear weapons (Chansoria 2013). To paraphrase another statement: "We need this thing if we don't want to be terrified as a nation." On October 16, 1964, China detonated a fission device in Lop Nor in Xinjiang, officially making it a nuclear power. The Soviet Union often assisted China in the development of nuclear weapons. The Soviet technicians departed China and ties worsened between the two nations following the Ussuri River incident⁸ in the middle of the 1960s. Because of this, China has strengthened its defence measures against the Soviet Union. However, Beijing does not believe the new Russian government constitutes a significant enough military danger to warrant nuclear preparations at this time. What the United States can do and its strategy are the only things that matter for its nuclear deterrent posture (Banerjee 2010). The manner in which China launched its nuclear weapons project provides more evidence that nuclear weapons cannot be used to wage or win a war. Instead, its nuclear arsenal is primarily intended to halt and reverse any military pressure from elsewhere. China's nuclear specialists and officials believe that part of their country's nuclear arsenal may withstand a nuclear assault or an attack on China's nuclear weapons using conventional weapons. As a result, China may potentially retaliate with nuclear weapons. Chinese officials believe they must have the option to deploy nuclear weapons to deter foreign militaristic pressure. China kept quiet about its nuclear philosophy when it became a nuclear power in 1964. However, it has maintained a nuclear strategy that calls for a minimum deterrence and a pledge to avoid initiating nuclear conflict. A nuclear weapons race would be very expensive to stop. Furthermore, it might be argued that the sole claimed rationale for acquiring these weapons was to deter pressure and blackmail from the other nuclear powers, namely the United States and the Soviet Union. (Korolev, 2020)

China tilts to India, 1949 to 1958

Between the years 1949 and 1958, China and India were quite close. This was in part due to the fact that both countries viewed the United States with suspicion and were concerned about the likelihood of instability in the region surrounding them in Asia. Both were within a short distance to the Soviet Union. Despite its disagreements with Moscow, China was a member of the communist coalition that fought against the alliance system headed by the United States. India was a non-aligned nation, but they looked forward to the Soviet Union for their economic development and saw Western imperialism as the greater danger. Because of Pakistan's close relations to the United States, both China and India viewed the country with a healthy amount of mistrust. Both of these groups held the view that Pakistan's Islamic basic values were incompatible with their own secular perspectives. (Bajpai, Ho, & Miller, 2020)

China tilts to Pakistan, 1959-1989

Beijing and New Delhi began to drift away, which ultimately led to war in 1962. This divergence was precipitated by the escalation of tensions between China and India over their shared border, which began in 1954 and continued on until the exile of the Dalai Lama in 1959. During this time, China and Pakistan came closer together, with the 1963 agreement that resolved their geographical disagreements serving as the cornerstone of their relationship. Between the years of 1959 and 1989, they functioned as de facto allies, despite the absence of a written pact stating that they would support one another in times of need. However, from Delhi's perspective, China and Pakistan operated in the same manner as allies, despite the fact that China did not become involved in any of the conflicts between India and Pakistan that occurred in 1965 or 1971.

Even though China and Pakistan presented an unified front against India (with China providing Pakistan with diplomatic backing and shipments of armaments), China's reasons for doing so were not straightforward. Beijing desired to wean Islamabad away from its too cosy connection with the United States government in Washington. This was in part due to the fact that Pakistan is geographically located in close proximity to Tibet and Xinjiang, which makes it an excellent listening post and a possible base for the United States. In addition to this, Pakistan served as an important intermediary for the Muslim world, notably in the Gulf and the Middle East. Even though China gave Pakistan with diplomatic and

military support (including help with nuclear and missile technology), there is evidence to suggest that the relationship was not entirely one-sided. Islamabad was able to pay off its obligations by acting as a mediator between the United States and China during the period of 1971-1972. In a practical sense, it allowed China to get the centrifuge technology that its nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, had already stolen from his former employers in the Netherlands. It also provided Chinese military specialists with access to US military equipment, which assisted them in reverse engineering a variety of systems. In addition, during the period from 1979 and 1989, Pakistan collaborated with the United States and China to wage an armed insurgency against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Lastly, China maintained tight ties with Pakistan in order to provide Islamabad an incentive to crack down on Uighur separatists who operated from Pakistani soil or whose activities were sponsored by Pakistani extremist organisations. (Upadhya, 2012)

China tilts away from Pakistan, 1990 to 2015

From 1954 onwards, but particularly when the Dalai Lama escaped to India in 1959, tensions on the border between India and China grew, and by 1962, the two countries were at war. Meanwhile, ties between China and Pakistan strengthened thanks to the 1963 treaty that settled border disputes between the two countries. Tacit since no official commitment to defend each other's interests was ever made, their alliance lasted from 1959 to 1989. Delhi, on the other hand, saw China and Pakistan as friends, despite the fact that China did not directly participate in either the 1965 or 1971 India-Pakistan conflicts. China had complicated motivations for supporting Pakistan in its fight against India, despite the fact that the two countries presented a unified front. Beijing hoped to separate Islamabad from Washington by straining ties between the two countries. The proximity of Xinjiang and Tibet to Pakistan made it a perfect listening post and possible base for the Americans. Especially in the Gulf and the Middle East, Pakistan served as an important intermediary for the Muslim world. (Lintner, 2019)

China has supplied Pakistan with diplomatic and military support (including nuclear and missile help), but the relationship was not one-sided, as shown by the fact that China also received assistance from Pakistan. Islamabad paid back its obligations by mediating the peace treaty between the United States and China in 1971 and 1972. The technology behind China's

centrifuges was stolen by the country's nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, from his former Dutch employers, and this deal made that technology available to China. It allowed Chinese military personnel access to US military hardware, which they used to develop backdoors and reverse engineering tools. Pakistan also collaborated with the United States and China to fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Last but not least, China maintained tight ties to Pakistan to give Islamabad an incentive to crack down on Uighur rebels based in or receiving assistance from Pakistan.

China tilts back to Pakistan, 2015 onwards

By the time Xi visited Pakistan in April 2015, Beijing was once again leaning toward Islamabad. This may be traced back to May 2014, when Narendra Modi became India's prime leader and instituted a more aggressive approach against China. Although ties between India and China were friendly in the weeks after Modi's arrival in Delhi, the new prime minister has already begun building an anti-China alliance including the United States, Japan, Australia, and Vietnam.

Between August and December of 2014, Modi visited all of these nations in a flurry of activity. In January 2015, President Obama became the first sitting U.S. president to attend India's Republic Day parade. During his stay, Obama signed a vision statement outlining future plans for US-India collaboration in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. Modi spoke at length about India's concerns over China, particularly Beijing's operations in the contested waters of Northeast and Southeast Asia, with all four nations. He took a hard line with Beijing on bilateral relationships, insisting that progress on a border deal came first and then normalisation of relations. (Jha, 2017)

Whether or not in direct reaction, China recently announced a \$64 billion investment plan in Pakistan's infrastructure. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) incorporates the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Beijing generally disregarded Delhi's concerns that the corridor between China and Pakistan would pass through Pakistan-backed Kashmir. The deterioration of relations persisted. Despite China's promise to rename the CPEC as the BRI, India still decided against participating. In return, Beijing has voiced its opposition to India's participation in the Nuclear Suppliers Organization and to UN actions taken against Masood Azhar, the commander of the Jaish e Mohammed, a terrorist group based in Pakistan that is

blamed for terror strikes in India. In October 2017, as India and the United States stepped up their anti-terror diplomatic campaign against Pakistan, Beijing defended Islamabad, saying that the Pakistani capital was really at the forefront of the global battle against terrorism. (Zhu, 2017)

A Triangle Made in History

For a very long time, India, Pakistan, and China have been at odds over their shared borders. India and China have fought on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), while India and Pakistan have fought on the Line of Control (LoC). Britain departed the subcontinent abruptly in 1947 as a result of decolonization after World War II. As a result, governmental frontiers in Southern Asia were redrawn in a disorganised fashion, making some territory available for conquest. India and Pakistan have fought four wars with each other since 1947. In 1962, India and China fought a border war. The Line of Actual Control and the Line of Control are places where India, China, and Pakistan often fight. All of these problems can be traced back to that long-ago time. After the Sino-Indian Border War in 1962, Beijing and Islamabad signed the 1963 Border Delimitation Agreement. This changed how the militaries of the three countries worked together. India doesn't like this deal because Pakistan gave China a piece of land in Kashmir called the Trans-Karakoram tract.. This meant that the war was now being fought on all three nations' soil. (Chellaney, 2011)

When the US didn't get involved in the India-Pakistan War of 1965, Pakistan thought it had been tricked by the US. As a result, it got closer to China. Pakistan thought that the U.S. would be on its side because of the U.S.-Pakistan Mutual Defense Agreement from 1954 and the fact that Pakistan was part of U.S.-made alliances like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization. But the United States helped India's military fight against Communist China during and after the 1962 conflict in a way that had never been done before. Because of this, it was smart for China and Pakistan to work together. Washington thought that if it armed both Pakistan and India, it could stop communism from spreading in Asia, which was one of the main goals of the Cold War. However, neither Pakistan nor India trusted Washington's claims that the weapons were not intended for use in a conflict between the two countries. China did not provide Pakistan with any direct military aid during the 1965 war, but it did attempt to terrify India by

claiming that New Delhi was becoming aggressive along the India–China boundary and threatening to strike back. (Lüthi, 2016)

During and after the India-Pakistan War of 1971, the US supported Pakistan because it needed Pakistani help to start peace talks with China in 1972. The United States' last struggle of the Cold War began in Afghanistan in 1979, and Pakistan was there on the front lines. Since geopolitics was more important to Washington than stopping the spread of WMD, it disregarded warnings that China was assisting Pakistan in building a nuclear weapon. Attempts at compromise by the Reagan administration did not bode well for ties between the United States and India. After the Cold War ended, China became a world power, and India followed suit not long after. This changed India and China's cooperative relationship, making them more competitive with one another and enhancing China's military ties to Pakistan. Terrorist strikes in India that had their roots in Pakistan, however, caused tensions between the two countries to linger and even escalate. This made it harder to get things back to normal. (Maxwell, 2018)

Conflict Scenarios

Maximizing interest via capacity enhancement is central to the regional stances of China, India, and Pakistan as well as U.S. strategy in Southern Asia. Both internal and external balance may achieve this goal. Given the already precarious security situation, this raises the stakes and raises the spectre of conflict. The following paragraphs explore some possible disagreements. (Mehra, 1991)

Two-front war

India worries about a two-front war with China or Pakistan because their border disputes haven't been resolved and because Beijing and Islamabad have a strong military and strategic alliance. Indian military leaders have said that they are ready for this to happen. "Two-front is a real situation," said General Bipin Rawat, who was head of the Indian Army and is now India's Chief of Defense Staff. Since then, we've been able to change a lot. The Army, the Navy, and the IAF are all now very ready for something like this to happen. India's military plans for a two-front war include increasing its overall deterrent capability and credibility, making progress in the acquisition and production of military equipment, recalibrating its

military strategy, training to fit the needs of the situation, and improving border infrastructure. Building infrastructure in border areas and arguing over who has the best land has caused a lot of trouble, as seen in the fights between Indian and Chinese forces in eastern Ladakh and the Doklam standoff. **(Malone, C. Raja, & Raghavan, 2015)**

Even though it makes sense for the Indian military to say that it is ready, others are not so sure. India and China fighting would probably be used by Pakistan to open a second front along the Line of Control. If India and Pakistan go to war, China could also open a second front at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) or in the Indian Ocean area. Even scarier, China and Pakistan could be planning to attack India with the military. Indian Army Chief M M Naravane said earlier this year, "It can happen anywhere, but the borders of these two countries meet at Siachen and Shaksgam Valley." People are most likely to work together on the strategically important glacier that makes us keep our possessions. In this kind of situation, he said, "For years, we've been focusing on the western border because that's where the dangers are." Now, we have to send more soldiers to the north." No matter how likely such a situation is, how people see it as a threat is likely to affect both India's military readiness and how it acts. **(Noorani, 2010)**

More than a Triangle: The Strategic Chain

More and more strategic analysts agree that the best way to describe security in Southern Asia is as a triangle, not as India and Pakistan. But outside players have a big effect on what keeps happening in this triangle, so might be better to think of regional dynamics as a strategic chain in which the United States is the most powerful outside player. The triangle and the strategic chain are two ways to look at geopolitics in Southern Asia. But these two ways are not in conflict with each other. Even though the inherent security dilemma in the triangle of India, Pakistan, and China is still a major factor in determining regional security, the full picture can be seen by looking at how the U.S. role complicates responses and counter-reactions in this triangle. The U.S. and India work together because of worries about China's rise. China and Pakistan see this as a threat, and India is worried about China and Pakistan working together. How safe the area is depends on all of these things. **(Palit, 1991)**

New Delhi has sought out to China's neighbours in an effort to negotiate agreements with Southeast and East Asian nations as China's influence rises in India's maritime and

continental surrounds. China and India pose an increasing military danger to each other on land and water. New Delhi and Washington have begun cooperating more because of this, and also because both China and the US aim to govern the globe. On the one hand, Beijing tries to convince New Delhi that India would be better off not fully supporting the US against China. To do this, it hosts meetings between top leaders from both countries and works with India in multilateral groups like the Brazil-Russia-India-China-Russia-South Africa (BRICS) group, the Russia-India-China (RIC) conference, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Beijing's controversial projects, like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), are meant to strengthen China's strategic ties with Pakistan. They also serve as a symbol for China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. This will cause India to feel even more alone (BRI). The U.S. strategy in the area depends on how people in the triangle see and respond to threats. So, the strategic chain is a great way to show how governments really work in South Asian countries. (Sen, 2003)

The Strategic Chain's Point of Friction

India, Pakistan, and China form a triangle based on how powerful and dangerous each country is seen to be. Things are getting worse in the area because the US and China are fighting more and more. China's most reliable ally near India is still Pakistan, and India is still the only country in the area that can keep up with China's growing power. (Sidhu & Jing Dong, 2003)

The regional dispute might worsen if there is strain on the strategic network. India's application to the Nuclear Suppliers Group exemplifies how a partnership between India, China, Pakistan, and the United States might exacerbate tensions in Southern Asia. Since India refuses to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, China views India's offer as equivalent to Pakistan's and hence rejects it. Also, China has resisted attempts to have Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) chief Masood Azhar designated as a global terrorist by the UN Security Council. It wasn't until this past year that they finally moved on. China's economic and political involvement in Afghanistan is carried out via Pakistan, so if the US exits, the security situation there will also disrupt this strategic connection. What Islamabad done endeared the Taliban to the Chinese authorities. China is attempting to reduce communication between extremist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan and Xinjiang Province's Uighur rebels.

New Delhi believes these changes are necessary because it must become simpler to work with all the elements crucial to Afghanistan's future. If the United States were to leave Afghanistan, the Taliban may reemerge as a political force, and Pakistan might try to reduce Indian dominance. This is why it's important to have open dialogue with the Taliban. These snags in the strategic network are making matters worse between India, Pakistan, and China. This makes the issues more difficult to address and more protracted in duration. (Yoder & Kanti, 2020)

Conclusion

India, Pakistan, and China form a triangle based on how powerful and dangerous each country is seen to be. Things are getting worse in the area because the US and China are fighting more and more. China's most reliable ally near India is still Pakistan, and India is still the only country in the area that can keep up with China's growing power. The security issue in the triangle will continue to worsen as a result of the power imbalance between India and Pakistan (which favours India) and the developing power imbalance between India and China (which favours China). China and Pakistan need to join forces to counter India's growing influence in the region. The triangle is further complicated by China's thoughts on a U.S. strategy termed "containment" that involves India. The likelihood of crises and confrontations occurring at the LAC and LoC will increase as long as widespread distrust and the belief that there is no winner in the triangle persist. Disagreements will arise in international forums on the security situation in Afghanistan and the surrounding area, as well as counterterrorism and nonproliferation efforts. Diplomatic efforts and trust-building measures are futile because of the complicated dynamics in the India-Pakistan-China triangle, which are exacerbated by the United States' role in the region.

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